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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
For over two decades, the global community has endeavored to prevent and combat violent
extremism. In that time, states and civil society partners have increasingly recognized
women’s role in this effort as critical to its success. The effective engagement of women,
representing half of the world’s population, is now understood as necessary to a “localized,
credible, inclusive, and resonant strateg[y] to build resilience to extremism.”1
However, gender-sensitive and gender-effective approaches to preventing and countering
violent extremism (PCVE) have remained elusive. Women’s involvement in PCVE strategies
continue to be largely marginal, often reinforcing harmful stereotypes, and sometimes
resulting in negative consequences for gender equality. This is particularly true for women
in minority ethnic and religious communities. The failure to effectively address the
discriminatory impact of PCVE strategies on women not only hampers the efficacy of PCVE
efforts but also impedes state party implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 2 which requires elimination of
discriminatory laws, policies and programming. The failure to maximally engage women in
PCVE efforts as leaders, designers, targets and partners also represents a lost opportunity
to implement CEDAW Article 4 measures to accelerate women’s equality.
The International Human Rights Clinic at the University of Chicago Law School conducted
this study with support from United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights. The goal of the study is to contribute to a better understanding of how PCVE
strategies and programming can effectively protect and promote women’s human rights and
principles of gender equality. The study involved in-country engagements with stakeholders
in Tunisia, Kenya and the United States. Through these interviews and an extensive
literature review, the report assesses how such initiatives have engaged and impacted women
and offers recommendations for improving strategies and interventions going forward.
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PROGRAM CATEGORIES
In each country, six categories of PCVE programs were reviewed:

media
campaigns

community
dialogue

community
policing

capacity
building

development

direct
intervention

v Media campaigns present counter narratives that facilitate social disapproval of
violent extremism.
v Development programs are aimed at discouraging violent extremism by addressing
economic motivations to join extremist groups, such as the provision of economic
opportunities or professional skills development.
v Direct interventions target populations considered to be “at-risk” of adopting
violent extremist ideologies.
v Community policing programs seek to improve the efficacy of the state security
apparatus by improving relationships between communities and state security.
v Community dialogue programs are aimed at improving the relationships between
community members by creating forums for dialogue.
v Capacity building focuses on improvement of individuals’ abilities to respond to
violent extremism.
v Assistance to returnee programs seek to reduce repeated participation of recruits
by making it feasible to leave an extremist organization and reintegrate in community
life.
STRATEGIC INTERVENTIONS
Programs assessed sought to make the following strategic interventions:
psychosocial
support
professional
skills
development

economic
opportunities

intra-familial
and
community
relations

counternarratives

detection of
extremist views

education
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v
v
v
v
v
v
v

Psychosocial support is provided to individuals and communities impacted by
extremism.
Economic opportunities are created and developed for individuals impacted by
extremism and at-risk of joining extremist movements.
Moderate and human rights-focused counter-narratives are presented to at-risk
populations and societies more generally.
Moderate or alternative education is provided to make counter-narratives more
accessible.
Training or capacity building is delivered on detection of extremist views.
Intra-community and intra-familial relations are improved through dialogue,
relationship-building and leadership opportunities.
Professional skills are bolstered for at-risk and impacted populations to facilitate
economic opportunities

NEGATIVE OUTCOMES
To determine the engagement of these programs with women and the impact on women,
programs were reviewed for the following potential negative outcomes:
Inadequate
Women's
Participation
and Leadership
Marginalize
Women

Backlash
Against Women

Instrumentalize
Women

Negative
Outcomes for
Gender
Equality

Harmful Gender
Stereotypes

RECOMMENDATIONS
Review of these programs and the resulting negative outcomes yielded a set of
recommendations for how countries and civil society partners can promote women’s actual
equality in the context of PCVE. When designed with human rights and women’s equality in
mind, PCVE programming can provide opportunities for women’s leadership and equality, as
well as build a foundation for long-term and effective partnerships with impacted
communities in preventing violent extremism:
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1. Employ a human rights approach that separates prevention from law enforcement.
2. Prioritize engendering and reforming the security sector prior to or in concert with
implementation of community policing programs.
3. Support building resilient communities that are inclusive, promote equality and engage
in dialogue to ensure interventions are effective and sustainable.
4. Avoid harmful gender stereotyping in program design even where such stereotyping
may lead to short term gains.

5. Engage women as change agents and creative leaders in all forms of programming.

6. Prioritize capacity building and education for sustainability.

7. Avoid instrumentalizing women which can undermine engagement and commitment as
well as serve as a lost opportunity to promote equality.

8. Emphasize transparency, assessments and evaluations.

9. Reform discriminatory laws and policies that provide context for interventions.

10. Consider mechanisms for rehabilitation and reintegration for returnees as an
alternative to prosecution and detention.

1.

Ensure a human rights approach in design, implementation and review of
PCVE efforts that separates prevention from law enforcement. Employing a
human rights orientation at the outset in designing a PCVE program sets the stage for
non-discrimination and equality. Such an orientation is likely to be much more effective
when prevention programming is separated from security oriented programming.
When programs combine law enforcement with prevention goals, initiatives are less
6

effective and undermine community participation and relationships. If communities are
only engaged within a security framework, they are less likely to see themselves as
partners, and more as targets of the state.
2.

Prioritize engendering and reforming the security sector prior to or in
concert with any community policing programming. Community policing
programs are likely to be much more effective when implemented in a framework that
seeks to engender and institute necessary human rights oriented reforms in the security
sector. Women are nearly uniformly under-represented and relegated to the lower ranks
of the security sector. Gender-mainstreaming in the security sector should be a top
priority in establishing gender-effective PCVE strategies. This includes incorporating
women in strategic security planning, as well as having female members of security
forces. Similarly, practices in the security sector that do not comply with human rights
standards, such as excessive use of force, should be addressed alongside community
policing programs so as not to undermine community trust and engagement.

3.

Focus on building resilient communities that are inclusive, promote equality
and engage in dialogue to ensure interventions are sustainable and effective.
Violent extremism inevitably impacts the economic, social, cultural and political wellbeing of an entire community. Program elements should encourage strong communities
that protect community values and encourage recognition of women and girls as critical
and equal voices by men and boys. This kind of programming can lay the groundwork
for other more targeted prevention interventions and ensure communities can be equal
partners in PCVE efforts in the long-term.

4.

Avoid counter-productive reliance on harmful stereotypes and traditional
gender roles. Some PCVE programs rely on harmful stereotypes, such as equating
women with motherhood or conceiving of them solely as victims. This kind of
stereotyping provides “short-cuts” to determine appropriate stakeholders and
anticipated roles. However, overreliance on such stereotyping can result in the
promotion of counterproductive and limiting traditional conceptions of women’s proper
roles and identity. While PCVE efforts may need to engage with the social and cultural
roles women tend to play in many communities and families, they should do so in a
thoughtful and reflective manner, aware of the costs and consequences to women’s
equality, and, where possible, inclusive of program components that seek to challenge
or question counterproductive stereotypes and traditional roles.

5.

Emphasize and promote women’s role as change agents and creative leaders.
To fully engage women as change agents, it is imperative that women play leadership
roles in program design and conceptualization. Doing so ensures programming benefits
from women’s experience, knowledge and perspective about cultural, political, and
social dynamics and conditions in their societies, communities and families. Engaging
7

with existing formal and informal women’s groups takes advantage of existing
leadership within communities.
6.

Emphasize capacity building and education elements of programs. Effective
capacity building and education provides tangible value to program targets and will
promote effective programming. This programming is especially valuable to women who
are often in vulnerable economic positions, underserved educational populations and
disempowered politically. These sorts of investments will have long-term returns and
ensure women are able to contribute to PCVE efforts over time more and more
effectively.

7.

Avoid instrumentalizing and marginalizing women’s rights. Instrumentalizing
women can undermine their engagement and commitment and serve as a lost
opportunity to promote equality. PCVE programs that incorporate women’s rights and
interests are also more likely to succeed in engaging women and women’s organizations.
Where PCVE programming engages women solely in order to utilize them as a means
of collecting information, for example, they are less likely to successfully develop
partnerships with women’s organizations if these organizations perceive women’s rights
as subsidiary to security concerns.

8.

Emphasize transparency and ongoing evaluations of unintended
discriminatory impacts of PCVE programming. Greater transparency regarding
funding sources, recipients of funding, and the evaluation of how the funds are being
used, and whether the programs were deemed effective, should be included in ongoing
program evaluations. The efficacy of PCVE efforts is enhanced when women and girls
are included in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. Transparency and oversight
also increases the efficient and effective use of funds.

9.

Address laws and policies that undermine a human rights approach to, and
limit and compromise, community participation. Programs that promote women’s
rights and maximize women’s leadership will face challenges in legal and political
environments that limit women’s autonomy and/or fail to promote equality. Similarly,
laws that undermine human rights will limit or even render ineffective PCVE
programming. PCVE efforts should support the passage and implementation of laws
and policies that promote women’s equality, allowing women to act as change agents.

10.

Consider new approaches for returning participants in violent extremism,
including rehabilitation and reintegration as an alternative to prosecution
and incarceration. Programming should be developed to more effectively address the
complex issues around returnees generally, and female returnees specifically. As more
and more women are successfully recruited and return to their communities, there is
an important opportunity to engage with difficult questions and conduct an analysis of
8

community and social conditions that may have encouraged women to join extremist
organizations and may now make it difficult or impossible for them to rejoin their peers.
Overall, researchers found that PCVE programs that incorporate a human rights
and gender sensitive and gender-effective perspective tend to do so primarily by
promoting resilient communities based on principles of inclusion and equality as
well as specifically recognizing women as rights-bearing core members of the
community.
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INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 3
This study was conducted by the International Human Rights Clinic at the University of
Chicago Law School (“IHRC”) with assistance from the United Nations Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (“OHCHR”). The purpose of the study is to conduct a
targeted assessment of best practices and strategies for protecting and advancing women and
minority human rights in government and civil society efforts to Prevent and Counter Violent
Extremism (“PCVE”). 4 The study reviews PCVE programs and initiatives in three
countries—Tunisia, Kenya and the United States—to assess how these efforts have engaged
and impacted women and, in the United States, minority groups more generally.5
Researchers selected Tunisia, Kenya and the United States as countries of interest in
consultation with OHCHR based on existing OHCHR and national level programs as well as
accessibility of program information. The study reviews PCVE programs in Kenya and
Tunisia for their engagement of and impact on women. The United States was selected for a
broader analysis that includes assessment of PCVE programs and their impact on and
engagement of women and minority communities. This was done primarily because of the
nature of programs in the United States that implicitly and explicitly target communities
based on ethnicity, race and religion. This practice has significant human rights implications.
Through this study, researchers explore whether PCVE programs in Kenya and Tunisia
advance or detract from the achievement of gender equality and whether women’s
participation and leadership are maximized. Program reviews are qualitative but focus on
the potential for six negative outcomes: (1) prompting backlash against targeted groups;
(2) marginalizing targeted groups; (3) inadequately ensuring the participation of
marginalized groups; (4) instrumentalizing the participation of marginalized groups;
(5) relying on stereotypes; and (6) encouraging violent extremism among targeted groups. For
the United States, researchers explore parallel issues in relation to the Muslim American
community.
This study utilizes both primary and secondary sources while applying qualitative research
methodology for its analysis and findings. A comprehensive review of existing print and
online sources, including newspaper articles, academic journals, country reports and other
international human rights law sources was supplemented by primary data acquired through
field research and interviews. On-site visits were conducted in Kenya and Tunisia from
March 13–18, 2017, and primary research in the United States was conducted on an ongoing
basis primarily through phone interviews with stakeholders.
A structured qualitative interview approach was used in all three countries. A uniform
questionnaire was designed to guide interviews and standardize information gathered. The
questionnaire addressed the following topics: violent extremism and responses from relevant
sectors; established PCVE programs, their goals and mechanisms; perceived effectiveness of
programs, with a focus on the impact on and involvement of women and (in the United States)
minority communities; concerns about these programs from a human rights and gender
10

equality perspective; current or planned efforts to evaluate effectiveness and impact of
programs on women and gender quality; and recommendations for improved approaches and
strategies.
For Kenya and Tunisia, interviewees were identified and contacted with the assistance of
OHCHR country offices and their local partner organizations. IHRC conducted in-person
interviews with individuals victimized by violent extremism and with individuals affiliated
with civil society organizations that were either directly developing or monitoring PCVE
programs. For the United States, interviewees were identified through the United States’
formal PCVE strategy, Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the
United States, as well as through an online survey of Countering Violent Extremism (“CVE”)
programs and through programs funded by the Department of Homeland Security and the
National Institute of Justice. Interviewees were contacted by email and phone. To preserve
confidentiality of participating interviewees, only the date, location and organizational
affiliations are identified in this report. Interview notes are on file with authors.
WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND PCVE STRATEGIES
Human rights protections have long been accepted as critical elements of PCVE strategies.
Under the United Nations Global Terrorism Strategy developed at the 2005 World Summit,
four primary pillars were identified as necessary to implement the strategy. 6 Pillar IV
requires “measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism”.7 The global commitment to engaging in
PCVE strategies in a human rights-compliant manner has been reaffirmed repeatedly, most
recently, by the U.N. High Commissioner of Human Rights in his 2016 annual report to the
General Assembly.8
This global commitment is compelled by core human rights treaties. Articles 18 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) protect freedom of thought and religion9 and Articles 19 affirm
the right to freedom of opinion and expression.10 Under these sources of international human
rights law, all policies and programs to prevent and counter violent extremism, especially
those that involve the use of force, must adhere to fundamental human rights principles that
protect individual thoughts, opinions and speech, as well as a myriad of other human rights
protections that protect the right to life, fair process and non-discrimination, among others.11
More recently, a more specific focus on women’s human rights and the promotion of gender
equality in the context of PCVE strategies has emerged, though effective and treatycompliant mechanisms remain unsettled. In late 2015, the U.N. Secretary-General released
the Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism 12 (“Plan of Action”) to ensure a
comprehensive approach to violent extremism that “encompass[es] not only ongoing,
essential[,] security-based counter-terrorism measures, but also systematic preventive
measures.” 13 The Plan of Action recommends that Member States “consider developing a
national plan of action to prevent violent extremism”14 that includes governmental and non11

governmental actors. 15 In reference to gender equality and women’s rights 16 , the Plan of
Action notes that “women’s empowerment is a critical force for sustainable peace”; that
“women do sometimes play an active role in violent extremist organizations”; and that
“societies for which gender equality indicators are higher are less vulnerable to violent
extremism”.17 With these considerations as background, the Plan of Action recommends that
member states:
v ensure that the protection and empowerment of women is a central consideration of
strategies devised to counter terrorism and violent extremism;
v ensure that efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism do not adversely
impact women’s rights;18
v mainstream gender perspectives19 across efforts to prevent violent extremism;
v invest in gender-sensitive research and data collection on women’s roles in violent
extremism, including identifying the drivers that lead women to join violent extremist
groups, and isolating the impacts of counterterrorism strategies on their lives, in order
to develop targeted and evidence-based policy and programming responses;
v include women and other underrepresented groups in national law enforcement and
security agencies, including as part of counterterrorism prevention and response
frameworks;
v build the capacity of women and their civil society groups to engage in prevention and
response efforts related to violent extremism; and
v ensure that a portion of all funds dedicated to addressing violent extremism are
committed to projects that address women’s specific needs or empower women, as
recommended in the Secretary-General’s recent report to the Security Council on
women, peace and security.20
Despite these commitments, concerns remain that PCVE programming and strategies have
failed to effectively implement measures that ensure women’s participation, promote
women’s leadership and advance gender equality. In the 2015 UN Women Global Study on
the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (“UN Women
Study”), authors express concerns on the global approach to PCVE from a women’s rights
perspective.21 The UN Women Study notes that while “[t]he UN human rights system has
increasingly addressed the issue of gender and terrorism,” 22 there has been a “deeply
problematic” shift in the frequency with which the Security Council has referred to women’s
empowerment as “a mitigating factor to the spread of violent extremism”.23 The UN Women
Study explains that “[t]o enmesh such programmes in [top-down] counterterrorism
strategies, sanctioned by the Security Council, is to deeply compromise the role of women’s
organizations and women leaders associated with the programmes”.24
These concerns are also detailed in a 2016 report on Human Rights in the Context of
Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion
and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism
(“Special Rapporteur Report”). 25 The Special Rapporteur Report explores the “[i]mpact of
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measures that target specific groups or individuals” and considers the link between violent
extremism and gender.26 It details concerns about existing methods of involving women in
PCVE programming, noting that:
[c]ritics have observed that efforts to include women have tended to emphasize
their engagement only at the informal or local level and often in ways that use
and reinforce gender stereotypes (women as victims of terrorism; women as
mothers). They also run the risk of instrumentalising women’s engagement,
where women are empowered, educated or encouraged to participate only in
furtherance of an agenda to counter or prevent violent extremism. If women’s
rights become secondary to and identified with a broader agenda, the risks of
backlash against gender equality, women’s rights defenders and girls’
education increases, as does the possibility of the bartering of women’s rights
and gender equality when it is seen to further national security interests.
Further, more attention needs to be paid to identifying if, and when,
categorizing or documenting certain activities by women as countering or
preventing violent extremism will be unsafe, unprincipled, or
counterproductive.27
OHCHR has expressed similar reservations in its Report on Best Practices and Lessons
Learned on How Protecting and Promoting Human Rights Contribute to Preventing and
Countering Violent Extremism (“Report on Best Practices”) in July of 2016. The Report on Best
Practices calls for continuing “gender-sensitive research and data collection on the drivers of
radicalization for women and on their role in violent extremism.”28 It also notes that the
efficacy of PCVE programs will be compromised without the “comprehensive engagement of
women at all levels,”29 and that discriminatory PCVE programs may be counterproductive.30
Finally, PCVE efforts that “emphasize women’s engagement in ways that have reinforced
gender stereotypes,” may improperly instrumentalize women as “tools of national security,”
or “[lead] to allocating . . . resources in a way that risks further marginalizing women.”31 The
Report on Best Practices also notes a lack of assessments of PCVE measures for human rights
violations, particularly those which may result in disparate impact along gender lines.32
Amid these concerns, this study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of how PCVE
strategies and programming can effectively protect and promote women’s human rights and
principles of gender equality. No effective strategy to prevent or counter violent extremism
can do so without the involvement of roughly half of the world’s population. The inclusion of
women not only leads to a more comprehensive understanding of violent extremism but also
leads to more “localized, credible, inclusive, and resonant strategies to build resilience to
extremism.”33 Moreover, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) 34 mandates effective and reflective implementation of PCVE
efforts that are gender-sensitive and gender-effective. Under CEDAW, state parties have
committed to eliminating gender discrimination, including by “abolish[ing] all discriminatory
laws,” and by “ensur[ing] [the] elimination of all acts of discrimination by persons,
13

organizations or enterprises.”35 Towards this end, parties to CEDAW must take affirmative
measures to ensure and promote women’s equality.36 These commitments apply to all social,
cultural, legal and economic PCVE strategies and initiatives, whether directly implemented
by the government or with partners in civil society.
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GENERAL FRAMEWORK: THEORIES AND DEFINITIONS
DEFINING BASIC TERMS
Violent extremism is a term widely used but its meaning is unsettled in the global
community. 1 The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), for
example, defines violent extremism broadly as “advocating, engaging in, preparing, or
otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic
or political objectives.” 2 The African Union Commission provides this description of how
violent extremism operates:
Terrorist groups exploit and capitalize on social grievances, unresolved
conflicts, personal or community identity claims, religion, history,
marginalization, exclusion and a host of other factors, to produce an ideological
narrative that creates an enabling environment for recruitment and
radicalization, where the commission of terrorist acts becomes appealing as an
instrument of political activism.3
The U.N. Human Rights Council (the “Council”) notes that violent extremism is often
understood by the goals of violence, as it is “generally conceived of as aimed at achieving
political, ideological or religious goals, or as the means employed by groups that reject
democracy, human rights and the rule of law.”4
Domestic legal definitions of “violent extremism” and related terms such as “terrorism” and
“religious extremism” tend to vary by state. Some states focus on the behavior while others
emphasize the political and/or religious motivation, such as whether the violence is motivated
by opposition to “democracy.”5 In many states, the consequences of labeling an act as “violent
extremism” and/or “terrorism” are often significant as this designation converts a domestic
crime into a national security concern, often carrying heightened criminal penalties along
with lessened constitutional and human rights protections for the alleged perpetrator. 6
Labeling an act “violent extremism” or “terrorism” can also expand the types of behavior
subject to criminal penalties. For example, where an act is “terrorist,” the violent act may not
only be criminal but “incitement” to that act may as well.7 As the Council has observed, a
“legal or policy framework that fails to clearly define the phenomenon it seeks to address not
only risks leading to inefficient measures, but may also become harmful.”
IDENTIFYING THE DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
There is significant debate as to why people resort to violent extremism and there is no
definitive profile for susceptible individuals.8 The Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
promotion and protection of human rights while countering terrorism stresses that “the path
to radicalization is individualized and non-linear, with a number of common ‘push’ and ‘pull’
factors, but no single determining feature.”9 Push factors are characterized as those that
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attract men and women to join groups; pull factors are the means by which groups recruit.10
The U.N. Secretary-General has stressed that social, political and environmental factors
foster violent extremism, including “poor governance, democracy deficits, corruption and a
culture of impunity”11 and that violent extremist narratives become attractive where “human
rights are being violated, good governance is being ignored and aspirations are being
crushed.”12
Academic studies on terrorism and violence identify both structural factors and social and
psychological dynamics as potentially encouraging extremism; newer models emphasize
ideology, globalization and religion as relevant as well. 13 Below are five often discussed
models that attempt to explain drivers of violent extremism: the material factors model, the
rational choice model, the community norms model, the individual motivations model and
the intragroup model. These models provide a useful backdrop for assessing the efficacy of
PCVE program implementation and programming and its engagement with gender-related
goals.
MATERIAL FACTORS MODEL
The material factors model associates material deprivation—such as lack of economic
opportunity, social marginalization and discrimination—with the risk of participating in
violent extremism. 14 The theory hypothesizes that lack of access to economic means and
resources leads people to alternative methods of securing material goods, which may include
participating in violent extremist groups that promise material gain. From a gender
perspective, this model can provide some explanation for why women in particular, who often
have more limited economic opportunities than men, could be drawn to extremist ideologies
and group infrastructures, where such groups provide greater economic independence and
opportunities for female leadership and autonomy.
According to this model, violent extremism may be prevented by implementing programs that
address structural economic inequalities.15 Programming aimed at eliminating recruitment
of women would have to address economic inequalities resulting from gender discrimination.
Successful programs could disrupt recruitment pathways for women by offering alternatives
to their social and economic deprivation.
Though this model has found support in various sectors, some sociological studies suggest
that individuals who turn to violence are not necessarily more likely to have histories of
deprivation, poverty or unemployment than the general population. 16 Moreover, numerous
instances of violent extremism have been perpetrated by individuals with higher than
average levels of education attainment.17 While this finding may not undermine the material
factors model, it does indicate that the push and pull mechanisms are more complex than the
model alone is able to capture.
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RATIONAL CHOICE MODEL
The rational choice model emphasizes the autonomy of the individuals who chose to engage
in extremism. According to this model, extremists are among a minority who reject
nonviolence in liberal democracies because civic engagement and legal mechanisms are
ineffective, distrusted or time consuming. 18 Thus, rather than committing violent acts in
objection to material deprivation, violent groups act against a perceived injustice.19 Under
the rational choice model, terrorist campaigns are meant to advance ideological ends by
garnering attention, discrediting the government and demoralizing officials. 20 Under this
model, women may choose to participate in violent extremism in opposition to various
perceived social injustices as a way of disrupting the existing social, political or economic
order.
COMMUNITY NORMS MODEL
The community norms model posits that extremist beliefs are impacted and regulated by
communities. There is no reliable evidence linking communities that express ideologies
consistent with violent extremism to actual participation in violence.21 However, theories do
indicate that the community may facilitate the continuation of violence, either through
community approval or through material aid.22 Alternatively, if the community determines
that violence is disproportionate or that violence creates suffering within the community
itself, community opposition can also decrease incidents of violent extremism.23 Support for
violent extremism in communities can fluctuate over time and depends on circumstances. At
the start of conflicts, communities tend to have low levels of support for violence. This support
may increase over time as narratives supporting violence are disseminated in the
community.24
Under this model, women’s engagement in PCVE efforts will likely be determined by the role
they play in the community, such as whether they serve in leadership positions, have forums
for expressing their views and are in dialogue with other community members.
INDIVIDUAL MOTIVATION MODEL
Some theorists view violent extremism as a decision made by the individual alone. 25
However, as individual decisions are often influenced by others, vulnerability to violent
extremism may still be linked to social isolation and marginalization.26 Under this theory,
policies that promote social trust and political engagement are important in counteracting
these factors. For example, while religious ideology is often assumed to be a reason for
participating in violent extremism, studies indicate that Muslims with high attendance at
religious centers are less likely to participate in violent extremism.27 Thus, the theory holds
that ties and relationships to a religious community reduce the pull towards violent
extremism, rather than encourage it. As under the community model, women’s participation
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in PCVE will be linked to their participation and involvement in the public and religious life
of a community as voices that influence others as well as to reduce their own isolation.
INTRAGROUP MODEL
The fifth model evaluating the factors that contribute to violent extremism focuses on
intragroup dynamics. Violent extremist groups have a shared commitment and risk level,
which creates solidarity in their articulated mission. 28 The development of insular groups of
people dedicated to using violence generally leads to isolation and amplification of their
shared beliefs and ends. This can be further reinforced by an intolerance of internal dissent.29
As a result, particular groups will remain committed to violent ends, regardless of whether
violence is achieving their goals. In such situations, violent extremism may continue to exist
until the group itself is dismantled.30 Here, PCVE programs that assist women returnees in
reintegrating into their communities are critical. For women considering leaving violent
extremist groups, the difficulties of returning are likely important factors to consider.
PCVE PROGRAM TYPES
PCVE programming is often characterized as violence prevention in which future acts are
countered by protective measures.31 The tension inherent in PCVE programming, then, is
that targeted communities and individuals are seen both as vulnerable and as potentially
violent.32 Thus, strategies tend to focus on building resilience in individuals and communities
as well as addressing the tangible conditions that may drive violent extremism, as
summarized above.
PCVE strategies encountered by researchers generally took the following forms:
Media campaigns sought to present counter narratives that facilitate social disapproval of
violent extremism. 33 Those interviewed generally agreed that media campaigns could
effectively deliver moderate messaging and education on social, religious or politico-legal
topics which provide counter narratives to extremist ideology.34 However, some interviewees
expressed some skepticism about the efficacy of media campaigns, 35 noting that some,
primarily web-based efforts, had only been modestly successful as measured by clicks and
other interactions.36
Development programs aimed to discourage violent extremism by addressing economic
motivations to join extremist groups, such provision of economic opportunities or professional
skills development. When implemented in a gender sensitive manner, development programs
have also sought to reduce power differentials and gender inequalities in a community,
strengthening women’s ability to contribute to community PCVE efforts.
Direct interventions targeted populations considered to be “at-risk” of adopting violent
extremist ideologies. Some direct intervention programs also intervened where populations
have already encountered, participated in or been affected by violent extremism. These
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programs usually operated by providing psychosocial support, such as counseling or
mentoring, and social and cultural opportunities, particularly for youth. 37 Some provided
economic opportunities such as vocational skills training.
Community dialogue programs aimed to improve the relationships between community
members by creating forums for dialogue. The goal was to encourage examination of
extremist narratives by providing opportunities for community self-education. These
programs sought to offer a platform for participants to express their opinions and ideas,
which is thought to improve the psychosocial well-being of community members.
Community policing programs sought to improve the efficacy of the state security
apparatus by improving relationships between communities and state security. When police
and policed communities have cultivated a relationship based on mutual knowledge and
respect, the legitimacy of the former and the human rights of the latter are strengthened. A
concern is that community policing programs are sometimes security-oriented, rather than
community-oriented; in such a situation, interventions are actually crafted to provide police
with access to a community, rather than to foster community-police relationships.
Capacity building focused on improvement of individuals’ abilities to respond to violent
extremism. Some programs focused on providing economic opportunities necessary for local
actors to effectively execute their programs. Other programs focused on developing
professional skills.
Assistance to returnee programs sought to reduce repeated participation of recruits by
making it feasible to leave an extremist organization and reintegrate into community life.
Programs that provided assistance to returnees included those providing psychosocial
support, presenting counter-narratives, offering moderate education, or delivering economic
opportunities to address the multitude of pull factors that might be exerting their influence
on returnees.
PCVE PROGRAMS GOALS
The PCVE program interventions described above generally seek to accomplish seven
primary goals, which can work in concert: providing psychosocial support, providing economic
opportunities, presenting counter-narratives, providing moderate education, detecting
extremism, improving community relations, and developing professional skills. Keeping these
goals in mind is useful in assessing gender equality and impact on women’s participation,
experience and empowerment in PCVE programming.
Psychosocial support aims to create buffers for at-risk populations to discourage them
from engaging in extremism by providing social connections and needed resources. For
instance, at-risk youth may be assigned mentors, and women affected by extremist activities
may be provided a social circle of other women with similar experiences.

21

Counter-narratives provide alternative descriptions that reinterpret social, religious and
philosophical ideologies in a way that discourages rather than encourages extremism. For
instance, representing religious text in such a way that emphasizes peaceful resolutions of
conflict or condemns the use of violence can offer an alternative to extremist religious
interpretations.
Moderate education discourages extremism by providing knowledge about civic matters
such as good governance and an analytical and informed approach to religion. Education
seeks to put in place and operationalize other goals as well, such as presenting counter
narratives.
Detecting extremism serves law enforcement and deterrence purposes. This is most
frequently done through law enforcement, intelligence gathering and profiling characteristics
that can lead to participation in violent extremism.
Professional skills development provides or facilitates professional opportunities and
capacity of those who are at-risk of adopting violent extremist ideologies, as well as
communities impacted by extremism, in order to reduce their vulnerability to extremism.
While capacity building usually seeks to improve access to political structures and
community organizations, skills development cultivates individual skills, including those
relevant to the labor market and to politics. Some programs may provide economic
opportunities more directly by providing material support.
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THE IMPACT OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM ON WOMEN
Violent extremism has significant negative and broad-ranging consequences for affected
communities. It can increase social insecurity; compel governments to redirect resources
needed from social services to law enforcement; erode public and government will to prioritize
human rights; and stigmatize and marginalize affected communities.1 Violent extremism can
also restrict individual enjoyment of a number of basic human rights, including the rights to
life, liberty, physical integrity, participation in public life and freedom of movement, as well
as the rights from all forms of violence, including sexual violence, enslavement and forced
pregnancy.2 It can also have a marked socio-economic impact on communities by preventing
children from attending school, placing additional burdens on a country’s health system and
undermining social and economic development efforts.3
The economic impacts, alone, of violent extremism are great: the direct and indirect cost of
violent extremism to the world was estimated to be about $53 billion in 2014.4 Some countries
are more impacted than others. For example, foreign direct investment in Nigeria dropped
by $6.1 billion in 2010 in response to increased incidences of terrorism in the country.5
Negative psychological effects related to violent extremism have also been documented,
including post-traumatic stress disorder, difficulty concentrating, trouble sleeping and
feelings of irritability and anger.6 After the attacks on September 11, 2001 in the United
States, studies found an increased use of alcohol, tobacco products and illicit drugs in the
United States population.7 Even more generally, after acts of violent extremism, people tend
to alter their routines and normal activities because they may fear another attack.8 In this
way as well, violent extremism undermines a community’s sense of well-being, cohesion and
security.9
Violent extremism can also have a devastating effect on minority groups and vulnerable
individuals. 10 For example, youth often experience a sense of disenfranchisement and
marginalization which leaves them vulnerable to violent extremism as both perpetrators and
victims. 11 As this report explores, in the United States, Muslim communities have been
subjected to discrimination and increased surveillance following acts of violent extremism in
the country.
Similarly, women are impacted by violent extremism in unique and problematic ways.
Violent extremism can exacerbate the negative consequences of gender-based discrimination
by, for example, placing even greater responsibilities on women for reproduction and
maintenance of families when male family members are recruited by extremist organizations.
Extremist ideologies and practices, themselves, often promote patriarchal structures and
traditional conceptions of women’s proper roles, which undermine women’s equality.12 Some
studies have suggested that gender inequality and “violent” conceptions of masculinities are
at the core of violent extremism13 and that women’s subjugation is used as a tool by extremist
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groups to reinforce traditional stereotypes of masculinity. 14 Along these lines, numerous
instances of gender-based violence by extremists have been reported. 15 For example,
extremist groups have lured young girls into leaving their homes to become the wives of
extremist leaders; Nigerian schoolgirls have been kidnapped, brainwashed and coerced into
becoming suicide bombers; and Yezidi women and girls have been enslaved, sexually abused
and traded like chattel. 16 Women have been raped and assaulted by extremist groups in
retaliation for their family members not joining extremist groups.17
These conceptions and practices, in combination with other extremist practices of forced
illiteracy and restrictions on freedom of movement, 18 can create significant barriers to
women’s equality in the economic, political, social and personal spheres.19 The Section below
highlights some particular areas of impact noted by researchers in Tunisia, Kenya and the
United States.
WOMEN AND FAMILIES
Violent extremism can have a significant detrimental impact on families and individual
members. Families may fall into economic distress when wage earning members join
extremist organizations or are the victims of violent extremist activities.20 This, in turn,
negatively impacts children’s academic performance or results in children dropping out of
school to assist the family economically.21 Recruitment of family members can cause family
conflict and alienation because of conflicting ideologies and paths.22 Conversely, families are
also vulnerable to “kinship recruitment,” meaning that multiple family members are more
vulnerable to joining an extremist group once one member of the family has been recruited.23
A recent survey of 474 foreign fighters, comprised of both male and female fighters from 25
Western countries, found that one-third have a familial connection to violent extremists,
whether through relatives or marriage.24 Similarly, families can lose community support and
resources as a result of stigmatization 25 and can be targeted by government security
interventions. 26 Family members may become traumatized by acts of extreme violence,
causing mental health or emotional difficulties that may affect family dynamics. 27
Emotionally, loss of a family member to a violent extremist group can cause a profound sense
of grief: sorrow at the loss of a child or husband; guilt at what they may have done or might
do in the future; and shame in the face of hostility from friends and neighbors. 28 Some
research suggests that wives of suspected violent extremists compensate by deciding to
“accept their fate,” and seek to separate themselves from the activities of their husbands or
other family members.29
Women, while increasingly the object of recruiting efforts, are still often most impacted by
the loss of male family members and the consequences of that loss. They may experience
heightened stress and anxiety due to family dissolution, as women often bear greater
responsibilities in maintaining and protecting family cohesion and well being. These
consequences range from grief over loss of their children to social isolation to descent into
poverty due to a lack of economic opportunities available to women. 30 Women whose
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husbands have joined extremist organizations are more likely to experience the economic
consequences of poverty than men in a similar position.31 Because of discriminatory laws,
unequal compensation and the underrepresentation of women in employment, women
struggle to serve as primary wage earners for their families after men have left. This,
combined with the stigmatization from the community, makes it extremely difficult for
women to effectively act as heads of households under these circumstances.
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
As noted, women whose children are recruited by violent extremists appear to often bear the
burden of attempting to keep their families together. According to a community organizer in
Tunisia, mothers often try to keep in contact with children who have left to join violent
extremist groups, often acting in opposition to their husbands and risking alienation from
family members who disown and distance themselves from the foreign fighters. 32 These
women often seek help from community organizations for assistance in finding their lost
children.33 Both mothers and fathers have attempted to track down children who have left
Tunisia, to reunite with them and have them return home.34
In Tunisia, reports indicate that family members sometimes distance themselves from
individuals accused of violent extremisms because the accused are often targeted by police
and government security forces.35 Families of the accused can be targeted by the security
sector through arbitrary raids, detentions and questionings. 36 Tunisian authorities often
place the families of returning foreign fighters under surveillance.37 Similar behavior was
reported in Kenya, where security forces monitored, interrogated and investigated families
and friends of those accused of violent extremism or those closely associated with extremist
groups.38
Kenyan groups noted that when family members joined extremist groups, other members,
including women, were sometimes influenced to join as well. Some were possibly motivated
by a desire to be reunited with their missing family members,39 especially when government
officials did not assist when loved ones disappeared.40 Other groups suspected women felt an
obligation to join their husbands, embracing the ideology that wives should follow their
husbands.41
WOMEN AND COMMUNITIES
Entire communities can be targeted by law enforcement because individuals from the
community have joined extremist groups.42 Police profile these communities and engage in
heightened security activities including arbitrary raids, house arrests, 43 detentions44 and in
some extreme cases, extra-judicial killings.45
Increased surveillance, restrictions and government control alter the dynamics and health of
a community. Studies suggest that the mere presence of a weapon increases aggressive
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behavior in people.46 The militarization of law enforcement may create a “warrior mentality”
in the police against the community they are supposed to serve. 47 In turn, community
members tend to view the police as unfair and disrespectful. This corrodes the community’s
views of the legitimacy of policing and broader governmental authority and can lead to
community members’ withdrawal from social regulation and political life.48
Apart from increased contact with the security sector, communities suffer when members
leave to join violent extremist groups. The social structure and labor market and, more
generally, the political and economic infrastructures are negatively impacted.49 For example,
there are immediately fewer workers in the community and therefore less economic
development. Women may be particularly impacted by community disruption. Those
affiliated with family members who join violent extremist groups may experience
stigmatization and community ostracization, which can have severe negative social, economic
and psychological impacts.50 Those women who relied on the foreign fighters for their income,
including their families or their employees, are likely to experience even greater economic
stress. 51 While this has not been thoroughly researched, studies suggest that women
experience higher rates of domestic violence when their families are in economic distress.52

IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
In Tunisia, Amnesty International has reported that police conducted over 1,880 raids in
2015 aimed at violent extremists in the country. Police forcibly entered homes without
properly identifying themselves or presenting a warrant or judicial order and proceeded to
point guns at residents. 53 Those arrested during the raids included many elderly and ill
individuals, and even those who were not arrested suffered consequences: some elderly had
medical reactions and children reported being terrified and in shock.54 Some communities in
Tunisia lost more than 30 members overnight because they left to join extremist groups
together. 55 As a result of this activity, several businesses and community buildings shut
down.56
In Tunisia, women associated with foreign fighters are often viewed with distrust and
judgment. 57 Similarly, in Kenya, women who are left behind when male family members
leave to join violent extremist groups are ostracized from society and stigmatized by
community members.58 This is due, in part, to government measures that target the families
of foreign fighters.59 “Women left behind” often do not leave their homes for long periods of
time because of feelings of isolation and shame.60
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WOMEN AND FREEDOM OF RELIGION
Violent extremism impinges on women’s freedom of religion. Because many extremist groups
advance violent ideologies as religious ideals,61 government reactions have sometimes been
to restrict religious freedoms when there is any suspicion of extremism. For example, various
countries in the Middle East and North Africa region that have experienced high levels of
terrorist attacks have also experienced high levels of government restriction on religion.62 In
2014, among the world’s 25 most populous countries, three of the five states with the highest
overall restrictions on religion were in the Middle East and North Africa region: Egypt,
Pakistan and Turkey.63 Violent extremist groups themselves are criticized for being abusers
of religious freedom—often attacking minority religious groups in their regions.64 Human
rights activists worry that restrictions of freedom of religion or belief will lead to an overall
dissipation of human rights because freedom of religion is closely tied to freedom of
association, peaceful assembly, opinion and expression, which are foundational to democratic
societies.65
Restrictions on freedom of religion limit women’s right to freely choose their dress and other
expressions of their faith. In 2014, for example, a court in Kazakhstan held that a preschool
was within its rights when it prohibited a young girl from wearing a hijab because it violated
the school’s dress code; the girl’s parents removed her from the school.66 The same year, in
the Czech Republic, a school of nursing banned women from wearing headscarves in class,
prompting at least two women to leave the school.67 In both of these countries, restrictions
on religion not only constrained women’s right to express their faith through their dress, but
also interfered with their right to education, and with that, their ability to participate in
society on a basis equal to men.
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
Research exploring cultural attitudes in Tunisia suggests that, while “Tunisians are now
generally very tolerant of religious dress that might be considered moderate, like the hijab
. . . the vast majority of citizens describe themselves as still ‘completely against’ the wearing
of more dramatic religious attire like the niqab.”68 Even men have reported “shaving off their
beards, eschewing traditional gowns, and limiting mosque visits to avoid harassment by
police who they fear will sweep up anyone who even looks militant.”69 In Kenya, reports
indicate that police profile those who look Muslim and ask women who wear headscarves to
remove them at security check points.70
Some Tunisian women, on the other hand, report feeling fearful of retaliation for not wearing
the hijab or for dressing in ways that might not be perceived as modest in Tunisia. One
woman reported to Slate Afrique that “[s]ocial pressure to put back on the hijab is huge,
especially in the less privileged classes.” 71 This was echoed in some of the interviews in
Tunisia, where women expressed that they had been harassed on the street for not wearing
a head scarf.72 The Pew Research Center reported in 2016 that “Tunisia is the only country
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in the Arab world and Africa where women report being harassed for dressing too liberally
and too conservatively.”73
WOMEN RECRUITS
Women who join extremist groups appear to do so for a multitude of reasons. The traditional
perception is that women leave to participate in “sexual jihad”, an alleged practice in which
women supposedly travel to conflict zones in order to volunteer sexual services to jihadists.74
Some reports speculate that women join to bear children and produce large families who can
be indoctrinated with extremist beliefs.75
Reports also differ as to whether women join freely or under coercion or duress. In some
profiles, young women appear to have been lured or deceived by extremists to join their
cause. 76 Others may have already been outcasts in conservative society—by having a
miscarriage, getting a divorce or having been raped—and extremists provide them with a
community and a way to escape by suicide if they want to move on to a better afterlife.77
However, while these reports focus on women victimized and deceived, there are also reports
that well-educated, independent women are leaving to join extremist groups voluntarily.
Some have speculated that these women, who have been described as “feminist jihadists,”78
do so to assert their own personal freedom and autonomy.79 Others believe that most women
who join extremist groups have either experienced trauma or are marginalized in their home
countries. 80 Still others posit that women join extremist groups for the same reasons as
men.81
Reports indicate that extremists are changing their recruitment strategies of women to
engage them more effectively, sometimes opening more significant roles to women. This may
explain why more university educated women could be joining extremist groups.82 There are
a few reasons offered about why extremist groups might want to recruit more women. First,
women do not arouse as much suspicion as men. 83 They are rarely subject to full body
searches and can more easily hide weapons in their clothing.84 Second, extremist groups need
more people in general and they may not be able to discriminate based on gender. Third,
extremist groups may be actively trying to change their image to show that they do believe
in some form of equality between the sexes.85 Fourth, it is likely that women extremists get
more media attention for their acts of violence than men, which can have benefits for violent
extremist groups that want to publicize their actions.86
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
In Tunisia, the government has estimated that between 100 to 700 women have left for
“sexual jihad,” but civil society organizations estimate that it is closer to 300 or 400.87 The
perception that women are only leaving for sexual reasons seems to have diminished over
time. Stakeholders interviewed by researchers described women as now actively
participating in extremist activities, sometimes by warning extremists of authorities,
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recruiting other members in person or online, assisting with information technology and
computers, or simply actively participating in violent actions.88
Women from Tunisia and Kenya, like men, are often recruited through social media. 89
Reports indicate that women are also recruited by friends and through relations in mosques
as well. It is also common for women to be recruited by members of their family; once one
member of the family is recruited, organizations have an easier time recruiting
other members of the family to join. 90 Often, young women are thought to join extremist
groups because they are in relationships with extremists (and may or may not know their
true identities)91 or because the extremists offer them large dowries.92 In Kenya, Universities
are new sites of recruitment for women, and extremists use ideological arguments to appeal
to well educated, middle class young women.
WOMEN RETURNEES
While research is sparse, various theories have been offered for why women leave extremist
groups. At least one study has suggested that disappointment in leadership is often a
motivating factor.93 Some stakeholders offered that women may become disenchanted with
the ideology; especially given that they are required to live in communities that restrict their
rights and autonomy.94 Others may return because their husbands or other family members
were captured or killed. 95 They may also return simply because their groups have been
defeated in the regions where they were stationed.96 Experts have indicated that those who
do return are likely not threats to their home countries.97 If the violent extremist groups
knew that they were leaving the group to return to their home countries, they would likely
face extreme punishment such as death; it has been reported that the Islamic State (also
“ISIS,” “ISIL,” or “Daesh”) had executed 116 foreign fighters because they wanted to return
home.98
Regardless, many countries have created legal regimes that place returning foreign fighters
under increased security. For example, the UK has a new anti-terrorism law that allows the
government to seize passports and travel documents for 14 days from dual nationals at
borders when terrorism related activity is suspected. 99 The government may also cancel
passports and place suspected terrorists immediately onto no-fly lists. 100 Other western
countries have also focused on constraining freedom of travel and restricting foreign fighters
from coming back into their home countries.101 The Netherlands reserves the right to revoke
the citizenship of convicted dual-national terrorists and Germany permits the government to
confiscate any and all travel documents should a person be suspected of posing a national
security threat.102 Many countries also have laws criminally punishing people for joining or
participating in violent extremist activities, so many returning foreign fighters may be
incarcerated.103 Countries like Belgium, France, Norway, and Germany have all detained
returning fighters under the suspicion that they joined a terrorist organization or violated a
travel ban.104
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Returning fighters are often the subject of increased security and surveillance upon return.
Those detained are often isolated or restricted in their contact with other detainees to allay
concerns that they will develop relationships with other returnees and become increasingly
radicalized. In 2015, for example, Tunisia passed an updated antiterrorism law, in the wake
of the attack on the Bardo National Museum, which “extend[ed] some police powers such as
pre-trial detention time, and lift[ed] a halt on [the] death penalty.”105 The law grants security
forces broad and vague monitoring and surveillance powers, extends incommunicado
detention from 6 to up to 15 days for terrorism suspects, during which time the suspects
cannot see a lawyer or family members, and will not be put in front of a judge, and permits
courts to close hearings to the public and allows witnesses to remain anonymous to the
defendants.106
When returning women are imprisoned and ultimately released, they may face additional
challenges as compared to their male counterparts. First, while in detention, all women
prisoners experience higher rates of physical and sexual abuse before entering prison, along
with higher rates of mental health problems and dependency on drugs and alcohol. 107
Because of their increased risk factors, women are more likely than men to attempt suicide
in prison.108 They also require a wider range of health services than men because of their
reproductive needs like menstruation and pregnancy.109 In some countries, women in prison
are particularly vulnerable to humiliation and sexual abuse within prisons, both by guards
and by male inmates.110
When exiting prison, women face particular challenges because of the lack of economic
opportunities compounding often strained family ties and the negative stigma they face in
their communities. In addition to transitioning into life outside prison, some women who have
left a violent relationship will have to establish a new life, which will bring with it additional
economic, social and legal difficulties. 111 Women are more likely than men to have been
treated for mental health problems in prison and thus often require treatment or counselling
after release.112 In certain countries, women released from prison are also at risk of murder
by their families, if they have been convicted of “moral offences,” or are the victims of rape or
other sexual abuse.113
Some countries do focus on rehabilitation and reintegration for returning foreign fighters,
though researchers did not encounter programs that targeted female returnees.114 Countries
with rehabilitative regimes for returning foreign fighters, include: Indonesia, 115 Saudi
Arabia, 116 Denmark, 117 and Pakistan. 118 Indonesia, for example, has adopted a “softapproach” strategy which engages returning fighters, providing counseling and incentives as
well as facilitate contact with the detainee’s families.119 Indonesian rehabilitation centers
assist those convicted of violent extremist activities in starting new lives by helping them to
set up businesses, enrolling their children in government schools, and giving them access to
religious counselling from moderate Muslim mullahs.120
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IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
In Tunisia, public attitudes appear to support the treatment of female returning foreign
fighters like their male counterparts, regardless of whether their recruitment involved
coercion. For example, organizations that service victims of violence do not appear to consider
female foreign fighter returnees part of their mandate.121 This may be the case even when
the woman was subjected to forms of coercion and deceit or may have experience sexual
and/or physical abuse by a foreign fighting extremist organization. 122 Service providers
expressed concern that these returnees may have continued involvement in violence and so
were reluctant to provide them assistance.123 In Kenya, the public perception is similar, and
many female returning foreign fighters face extreme societal isolation and often experience
post-traumatic stress syndrome symptoms.124
In Kenya, returning foreign fighters may face difficulties from both the government and
violent extremist groups. Disappearances of foreign fighters have been documented and some
human rights organizations have found evidence that the government is involved in these
disappearances. 125 This practice seems to affect both female and male returning foreign
fighters. In Kenya, Human Rights Watch reports that 6 of the 34 documented disappearances
and 1 out of the 11 documented extra-judicial killings were women.126
In Tunisia, there is very little public information about what happens to female foreign
fighters after the return from abroad. There have been reports that returning fighters have
been imprisoned immediately after returning to the country, deprived of many of their due
process protections.127 There are estimates that currently over 1,500 returning fighters are
in prison.128 While it appears almost all returning foreign fighters are housed in one prison,
it is unclear if women are also housed in this same prison when they return as well. 129
Alternatively, women returning fighters may be housed in a women’s prison in Tunisia.130
There appears to be no conclusive evidence that female returning foreign fighters are
imprisoned rather than interrogated and released.131
More generally, women in prison in Tunisia often face barriers to caring for their children.132
Children are able to stay with their incarcerated mothers until the age of three. Prisons do
not always have the adequate amount of supplies for children; there are often food, clothing,
and diaper shortages. There is often inadequate nutrition for prenatal mothers as well. In
Kenya, detained women are not allowed to receive any health services or to meet with any
family or outside representatives.133
Women returnees face various forms of stigmatization and marginalization. This is especially
the case for women who return with children who may be a result of a relationship or sexual
abuse. 134 Their communities and families may disown them. 135 Children born during
extremist activities may also have stigma attached to them.136 In Kenya, women involved
with Al-Shabab who have returned from Somalia pregnant or with HIV are often stigmatized,
and are unlikely to receive support from services or their communities.
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WOMEN’S LIVELIHOODS AND ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
The economic impact of violent extremism on women is a complex issue and likely varies by
context. Generally, because women fare worse than men economically, economic incentives
and consequences of violent extremism are likely heightened for women. Globally, women
are still lagging behind men in terms of labor force participation,137 and even in countries
where the participation approaches equality, women still earn less than men for performing
the same work.138
As noted above, the connection between violent extremism and economic opportunities is
highly debated. There is some evidence that there is a connection between unemployment in
a community and recruitment and radicalization.139 Violent extremist groups use economic
influences to encourage both men and women to join. For example, extremist groups often
pay people for material assistance, through provision of food or payment of salaries for
recruits.140
As noted above, because women suffer from more limited economic opportunities, they may
be more responsive to economic incentives offered by extremist groups. Examples provided
below from Tunisia and Kenya indicate that some of the motivation from women recruits was
financial stability and opportunity. As mentioned, women who are left behind by their family
members who leave to join extremist groups often struggle to support themselves and their
family. 141 Thus, the incentive of economic opportunities may become even more powerful
when male recruits have left families and communities in economic distress. Women may see
joining an extremist organization as the only way to support dependents given limits on other
income-generating options.142
Finally, violent extremism may cause diversion of government resources or losses in certain
industries which may also impact women’s lives. For example, government resources directed
towards extremism may be diverted from other sectors such as social services and education.
Also, some countries seen as harboring extremists may experience damage to certain
industries. Both reduction of social services and loss of jobs in the informal and low-wage
sector will have a negative impact on women’s lives.
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
Violent extremist groups use economic opportunities as a tool for recruitment, sometimes
employing coercion or deception. In Kenya, for example, there have been reports of a boy who
was tricked into going to the Middle East with a lure of an income opportunity. When he
arrived, he was taken to fight for a violent extremist group instead; he has apparently been
missing for 3 years now. 143 Similar stories have circulated concerning women. In some
reports, violent extremist groups promised high dowries to women in need of money.144
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Tunisia is a good example of a country impacted negatively by the mere perception that it is
vulnerable to terrorism. For example, in the wake of the Sousse beach attacks,145 the United
Kingdom’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office “advise[d] against all but essential travel to
. . . [most of] Tunisia.” 146 British tourism subsequently declined by 90 percent. 147 The
economic impact here cannot be understated: the BBC estimates that 15.2 percent of
Tunisia’s GDP consists of travel and tourism, and that 13.8 percent of all employment is
based in these sectors.148 The Tunisian government has, accordingly, “plead” with the United
Kingdom to “relax its travel advice.”149
If the economic incentives theory holds true, this negative economic impact caused by a
perception of violent extremism in a country may then have the adverse effect of increasing
extremism in a country such as Tunisia.150 As noted above, women may be disproportionately
affected by poor economic conditions that are exacerbated by extremism.
WOMEN AND THE ABSENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS
PCVE efforts often lead to human rights violations, including restrictions on free speech and
religion, curtailments of due process rights, and extra-judicial killing and torture.151 Women
suffer when communities loosen protections for human rights; human rights violations
contribute to insecurity and instability, which then often leads to more human rights
violations.152 Moreover, because of gender inequality and discrimination, women experience
compounded forms of discrimination when other factors such as age, ethnicity, disability or
socio-economic status, make them even more vulnerable to human rights violations.153
The right to personal autonomy encompassed in the rights to life, freedom of movement,
privacy and expression is often restricted for women, in particular, as a result of violent
extremism. Personal autonomy, which has been defined as “the desire to experience choice
and psychological freedom,”154 can include the ability to make choices for one’s self, including
choices about beliefs, dress, travel and association.155 One prominent example of women’s loss
of personal autonomy is limitations placed on their choice of attire, especially religious attire
worn by Muslim women. Many countries have already banned some form of Muslim religious
dress, and many others are contemplating similar restrictions; these restrictions not only
impact women’s choice of attire but also their ability to participate in public life.156 Unable to
dress in a manner consistent with their religion and culture, women may feel compelled to
withdraw from public spaces. Other potential personal freedoms that can easily be abridged
by programs aimed at preventing violent extremism include travel bans and restrictions,
controls on financial transactions and curtailment of freedom of association and speech.157
In addition to individual freedoms that may be restricted, when a government becomes more
restrictive for security reasons, women’s equality may be compromised as governments tend
to constrict the activities of women and the activities of those organizing for equality.158 Just
like restricting freedom of religion is often a knee-jerk reaction to violent extremism, many
governments have also restricted freedom of association in response to violent extremism.159
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Many counterterrorism laws have included very broad definitions of terrorism and illegal
activity, and therefore have been used for the direct and indirect targeting of women’s rights
organizing, women’s rights organizations, and women’s human rights defenders. 160 Some
salient examples from Tunisia are described below.
IN-COUNTRY OBSERVATIONS
In Tunisia, various enacted laws and policies have curtailed women’s freedom and even more
under consideration threaten to do so. As an example, the Tunisian legislature reviewed a
bill in 2014 to “introduce stricter controls on the niqab.” 161 According to the Ministry of
Interior, such controls were necessary because “suspects and fugitives deliberately wear
niqab for disguise and to escape from security units.” 162 Proposed legislation would have
banned the niqab in public places.163 Regardless of whether such a law reflects a legitimate
effort of the government to identify and detain suspects of violent extremism, it raises
concerns for women from a human rights perspective. 164 For example, though the law targets
the niqab, the justification provided by the government indicates that all forms of dress that
could be used as disguise (sunglasses, hats) should be subject to the same regulation.
Moreover, Article 1 of CEDAW requires states to take all appropriate measures to eliminate
discrimination against women, including laws that have a discriminatory impact on women.
Thus, this law would likely be in violation of Tunisia’s obligations under CEDAW.
In 2015, Tunisia passed an updated antiterrorism law, which “extend[ed] some police powers
such as pre-trial detention time, and lift[ed] a halt on [the] death penalty.”165 The law grants
security forces broad and vague monitoring and surveillance powers, extends incommunicado
detention from 6 to up to 15 days for terrorism suspects, and permits courts to close hearings
to the public and allows witnesses to remain anonymous to the defendants.166 The law also
expands terrorist offenses to acts “causing harm to private and public property, vital
resources, infrastructures, means of transport and communication, IT systems or public
services” when they are part of an individual or collective enterprise.167 The law also restricts
freedom of expression—any person who is found to have “publicly and clearly praised” a
terrorist crime, the perpetrator of a terrorist crime, an organization or an alliance connected
with terrorist crimes, their members or their activities could be sentenced to up to five years
in prison. 168 However, the law does not include any penalties on gross human rights
violations committed by foreign fighters.
The breadth of violent extremism-related criminal penalties created by this law is likely to
have a noticeable impact on women. As noted above, women continue to be in the minority
of recruits for violent extremist organizations and often play marginal and supporting roles
in any extremist activities. Thus, a law that expands the kinds of acts that qualify as criminal
acts is likely to result in more women being prosecuted and imprisoned for potentially minor
and low-level involvement in extremist organizations.
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In addition, women will be impacted by the limitations on religious freedom resulting from
government regulation of the mosques in Tunisia,169 as well as freedom to travel which is
curtailed with the recent travel bans for young Tunisians.170 Again, limitations on these sorts
of freedoms, while generally applicable, may have a disproportionate impact on women who
already often experience disparate limits to their movement and religious choice as a result
of gender discrimination.
Moreover, in Tunisia, public support for human rights appears to have eroded as a result of
violent extremism. In an effort to address this, Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) initiated a
campaign in Tunisia entitled “No to Terrorism, Yes to Human Rights” to educate the public
about the deterioration of human rights in Tunisia.171 The campaign primarily consisted of
videos meant to explain the potential effects of security measures that disregard human
rights against ordinary Tunisians. The videos featured four subjects: a filmmaker, a traveler,
a woman hurt by crossfire and an individual who was wrongfully detained. 172 While the
preliminary results were positive, further extremist activities resulted in a backlash against
the campaign and HRW. On television, HRW was referred to as “Zionist,” “US-backed,” and
“traitors with a hidden agenda.”173 On social media, HRW was sometimes referred to as the
“Terrorist Rights Watch.” 174 These sorts of public attitudes create an environment that
facilitates deprivation of human rights which is particularly dangerous for populations, like
women, already often subject to such violations.
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GENDER EQUALITY AND WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION IN PCVE
PROGRAMMING
As detailed above, violent extremism has a significant impact on gender equality and
women’s enjoyment of their human rights. Similarly, PCVE programming can have a
negative impact on women as well. Under CEDAW, states have a duty to review any
programming, policies and laws, including those on PCVE, whether implemented directly or
through collaborators and partners, to ensure discriminatory impact and other negative
human rights consequences for women are addressed. Moreover, as detailed above, under
Articles 3 and 4, state parties to CEDAW must take affirmative measures to address women’s
inequality. 1 PCVE programming implemented by the government, civil society and
communities provides an important opportunity to promote women’s actual equality through
leadership, inclusion, participation, empowerment and education.
PCVE efforts varied to some extent by context and needs of each country in Tunisia, United
States and Kenya. That said, implementing organizations seem to have coalesced around a
set of similar, non-security approaches. This Section surveys the main types of programs
observed by researchers:
media campaigns, development programs, direct
interventions, community dialogue programs, community policing, capacity
building and returnee assistance. Each program attempts to address one or more drivers
of violent extremism by providing psychosocial support, economic opportunity or
professional skills development, by presenting counter narratives, providing
moderate education, detecting extremism or improving community relations.
Researchers reviewed these various programs with attention towards whether, by design or
through impact, they detracted from women’s equality and/or limited women’s enjoyment of
their human rights as well as whether they missed opportunities to promote the rights and
equality of women. Researchers’ observations were informed by concerns expressed by the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism in a February 2016 report to the Human Rights
Council on the “[i]mpact of measures that target specific groups or individuals.” 2 Where
programs limited women’s rights and equality, they tended to do so in the following ways: by
prompting a backlash against women, marginalizing women, inadequately
ensuring women’s participation or leadership, instrumentalizing women’s
participation or detrimentally relying on gender stereotyping.
In this Section, researchers describe the considerations and possible risks associated with
each type of program. The goal of this analysis is to support program developers and
facilitators to “ensure that [their] efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism do not
impact adversely on women’s rights,” as directed by the U.N. Secretary-General. 3 Many
considerations listed below can be addressed with planning, attention to gender equality and
anticipated impact on women. Potential solutions and recommendations are addressed in the
next Section.
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One overarching concern is worth noting at the outset—the impact PCVE efforts may be
having on organizations promoting women’s rights and equality in environments vulnerable
to extremism. This issue has received full treatment in Duke University School of Law’s
International Human Rights Clinic Report, Tightening the Purse Strings: What Counter
Terrorism Financing Costs Gender Equality and Security. 4 As the report details, some
organizations doing important human rights work may find donor funding has been diverted
from women’s initiatives to PCVE efforts. Similarly, funding may be denied to women’s
organizations due to restrictions created in an effort to combat extremism. 5 Along these
lines, donors may place increasing administrative burdens on organizations that receive
funding in high risk areas making it difficult for smaller grassroots organizations to maintain
accurate and reliable financial accounts.6 These concerns all merit attention to ensure PCVE
programming does not undermine women’s rights efforts and that women’s peace and
security organizations are able to effectively assist in addressing violent extremism.7
MEDIA CAMPAIGNS
Media campaigns are a popular approach to raise awareness, present counter-narratives
and distribute critical messaging about violent extremism. Campaigns are thought to be
particularly effective in harnessing the power of youth engagement. For example, several
Tunisia-based programs are either engaged in or planning to implement programs to assist
youth in writing and performing rap and hip hop songs—a popular genre among Tunisian
youth—critical of violent extremism.8
Web videos are also being used to distribute messages to at-risk individuals. Such
programming currently includes debates, lessons on religion and national history, and
testimonials by family members of foreign fighters.9 Given that social media is used to recruit
individuals to violent extremism, the expectation is that this kind of programming may reach
these and other individuals, providing education, imparting a more tolerant and moderate
view of religion, promoting good citizenship and presenting the social consequences of violent
extremism.10 Web videos have also been developed specifically to convince viewers of the
importance of enforcing human rights guarantees and maintaining healthy police oversight,
even in the face of serious security concerns.11
Some organizations have taken on the production of documentaries. These include Raise Our
Voices, a documentary in which Kenyan women share their experiences of life without sons
and husbands who left to fight alongside extremist groups, as well as the experience of their
family members returning.12 Call Back Home, another Kenyan documentary, focuses on the
recruitment of youth to violent extremist causes.13 It includes interviews with community
leaders on promoting community cohesion and the prevention of violent extremism. These
leaders highlight misconceptions and misinterpretations of religious teachings that are
taught to youth by extremist recruiters.14 In Tunisia, one organization has produced a series
of short films featuring the experiences of women, two of which were in post-production as of
March 2017.15
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Finally, some organizations have turned to broadcast radio. 16 In Kenya, African Women
Advocating Peace and Security in Africa (“AWAPSA”) and Humanity, Activism, Knowledge,
Integrity (“HAKI”) Africa have introduced radio programs where women share their
experiences as “women left behind.” These radio programs are interactive, where listeners
can call in live to voice concerns and queries. This platform may also serve as a kind of
psychosocial support for affected women and may improve the community’s ability to detect
extremism.
Some organizations have begun to pursue strategies beyond traditional platforms to include
social media and peer-to-peer communication, including WhatsApp, when targeting youth
vulnerable to radicalization.17 AWAPSA and HAKI in Kenya have taken considerable steps
in this regard. The Kenya Community Support Centre (“KECOSCE”),18 which operates in
Kenya’s coastal regions, aims to empower communities to prevent and counter radicalization
through youth capacity building, community organizations, and community dialogue.19 To
reach wider communities, KECOSCE utilizes not only radio, but other multimedia such as
billboards, LED screens, and social media.20 As part of its Countering Violent Extremism
Through Multimedia and Forum Series initiative which targets youth aged 15 to 25 years in
Mombasa, KECOSCE is not only conducting bi-weekly radio talk shows, which feature PCVE
themed discussions, but also organizing forums which include screenings of Watutu film.21
Watutu showcases life and experience of a coastal Kenyan Muslim youth who became
radicalized and was recruited by Al-Shabab.22 The aim of such initiatives and forums is again
to present counter-narratives and highlight dangers of participating in VE activities.
Muslim groups in Kenya are engaging strategically to delegitimize Al-Shabaab’s use of Islam
to spread terror. The Building Resilience Against Violent Extremism (“BRAVE”) initiative,
the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (“SUPKEM”), and the Center for Ihsan and
Educational Development (“CIED”) are examples of organizations that focus on “countering
the use of Islam to legitimize violence” and have developed “programs to offset militant
ideology.”23 They run media campaigns on social and electronic media that aim to counter
extremist messages and teach Muslims about interfaith dialogue and the effects of terrorism.
Being Kenyan Being Muslim (“BKBM”) is another campaign to present counter-narratives.
The pilot BKBM initiative was a sixteen-contact-hour, multi-media course for individuals
who are exposed to extremist discourse, and for training professionals aiming to counter
extremism.24 An impact evaluation of BKBM concluded that the initiative’s pilot program
was successful in Kenya.25
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Considerations with Media Campaigns
In Tunisia, in particular, there could be greater efforts to involve women on an equal basis
in media campaigns. Involving women in media campaigns will avoid marginalizing
gender, instead ensuring women will gain access on equal footing to a forum for speech and
the opportunity to serve as educators and leaders. A lack of visibility of women in media is
marginalizing, leaving unchallenged conceptions of women as unimportant in efforts to
counter violent extremism. 26 Encouragingly, at least with respect to testimonial media
campaigns, it appeared that women’s voices are better represented.27 It also does not appear
sufficient efforts are made to reach female audiences—either with respect to the format or
the content of the messaging. Failure to consider women as target listeners not only
represents a missed opportunity to reach half of the population, but has the potential to
further marginalize women, as they may not receive the benefits of effective programming
on par with their male counterparts.
Efforts to involve women must also keep in mind the potential for media campaigns that
promote human rights and/or women’s human rights to prompt backlash against women.28
The backlash against human rights defenders following the Human Rights Watch campaign
in Tunisia may serve as a cautionary tale. Depending on the social and cultural climate in
which a campaign takes place, an environment with an increasingly negative attitude
towards human rights protections could pose risks unique to women, who are already
vulnerable due to their gender. Media campaigns by necessity expose participants to a larger
audience who will become aware of their or their family’s association with violent extremism
or their efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism. These considerations may be
ameliorated with attention to context-appropriate messaging, advanced planning and
anticipation of potential negative consequences.
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Researchers in Tunisia encountered one development program managed by the Union
Nationale de la Femme Tunisienne (“UNFT”) and apparently funded in part by the Ministry
of Women’s Affairs. UNFT provides vocational training, instruction for women and girls in
animal husbandry and beekeeping, material assistance in the form of clothing and household
goods, and opportunities for girls to participate in sporting events. While UNFT’s primary
aim was to alleviate poverty, it also expects the support provided to help in preventing women
and girls from getting involved with violent extremists.29 Particularly on the southern border
of Tunisia, it is not uncommon for women to cook or otherwise share food with members of
extremist groups in exchange for a modest sum of money.30 Providing this kind of economic
support, then, is hoped to decrease the incentives for women to indirectly support violent
extremism in the region.
In Kenya, a development program called Kenya Tuna Uwezo31 (“KTU”)32 aimed to reduce
politically motivated conflicts in Nairobi’s informal settlements and Eastleigh.33 Based on the
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premise that feelings of marginalization and alienation from the society in informal
settlements can lead to conflict and violence, KTU created opportunities and “increase
demand for cooperative action among conflicting groups.” 34 After four years of program
implementation, KTU had provided entrepreneurial and technical training to youth to assist
them in starting small businesses and securing skilled employment 35 and facilitated the
creation of small business for some youth. 36 In addition, KTU trained other civil society
organizations in conflict-sensitive programming and violent extremism. It also engaged
vulnerable at-risk groups to engage in constructive dialogue on community needs and
challenges.37
Considerations for Development Programs
Development programs, such as the one run by UNFT, should also account for potential
backlash against women, particularly where only women receive benefits or where women
primarily receive benefits. UNFT’s vocational training, for example, offers training in small
animal care and beekeeping, work which is often seen as that of women and girls.38 However,
as always, concerns about backlash are weighed against the advantages of addressing
existing inequalities and the value they provide in promoting women’s equality.
Strikingly, researchers were told in more than one interview in Tunisia of the existence of a
generation of “chômeurs diplomés,”39 men who are reluctant to pursue menial employment
that they believe to be below their education or skills level.40 This was said to be less the case
with women who were more likely to accept any available employment. If true, it may make
it less likely that men will react negatively to women receiving preferential or exclusive
access to job training in these undesirable professions. However, this, in turn, raises the
concerns that programs may marginalize women by relegating them to low paid or
undesirable professions or rely on gender stereotypes, by limiting training to areas of work
thought to be appropriate for women and girls.
Thus, program developers should be wary of inadequately ensuring women’s
participation in development programs, particularly where material assistance is
distributed, and ensure such assistance is provided in a way that promotes women’s equal
access to desirable employment while also anticipating and addressing potential backlash
caused by cultural norms that may perceive work as determined by gender.
DIRECT INTERVENTIONS
Direct intervention programs focused on providing psychosocial support to individuals
directly impacted by extremism. In Kenya, the Women’s Initiative for Female Empowerment
(“WIFE”) brought together “women left behind” by family members fighting with violent
extremist groups abroad, offering them psychological support and an avenue for
reintegration in their communities. This program also sought to train women on how to
engage with other at-risk individuals, with an aim to increasing the community’s ability to
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detect extremism. African Women Advocating Peace and Security in Africa (“AWAPSA”) and
the Coastal Education Center (“COEC”) run a similar program, Women Against Violence
Extremism (“WAVE”) that provides trauma counseling to “women left behind” and to those
targeted by law enforcement.
UN Women Kenya also supports local partners to provide safe spaces for women to share
their experiences and regain their confidence in a protected environment.41 Some safe spaces
also serve as shelters for women who have been victims of extremism or other violence.42
Support groups and safe spaces can be a great source of strength for affected women.43 In
addition to providing psychosocial support, some programs also provide affected women with
economic opportunities to assist in reintegrating them into their communities. In this sense,
direct interventions may resemble development programs. For example, as part of WAVE,
COEC has been connecting women with small savings and micro-finance loan services to
“help them start up their own businesses, building their self-reliance and ability to provide
for themselves and their families.”44
Support groups also aim to improve the community’s ability to identify at-risk individuals.
By sharing their experiences, women help each another identify “early-warning signs”
exhibited by male family members. A USAID activity assessment conducted in 2015 reported
that “women and girls . . . [have] an important role in resisting violent extremism, because
they [are] in a better position to observe changing behaviors of their children or significant
others.”45 Humanity Activism Knowledge Integrity (“HAKI”) Africa, going one step ahead, has
also started to train women to identify at-risk youth. As highlighted by a United States Peace
Institute’s study, developing mothers’ skills to identify early warning signs of radicalization
inculcates confidence and determination in them to move beyond the family sphere and
engage the community through media and technology. 46 However, some stakeholders in
Kenya were skeptical about the effectiveness of such programs. 47 According to one
stakeholder, children hide their activities from mothers, and hence, the assumption that
mothers are a good point of access to at-risk children does not hold ground. 48
Fionnuala (2015), on the other hand, states that such programs underestimate “the personal
and social contexts in which these women live in ways that fail to appreciate the complexity
of the roles they play in their families and communities.”49
Mentoring programs offer another form of support and are common in Kenya. AWAPSA,
HAKI, and MUHURI Africa run youth mentorship programs. Royal United Services Institute
(“RUSI”) pairs former criminals with youth mentees, which allows the mentors to provide a
counter narrative about participation in crime. HAKI engages young individuals from 14 to
30 years of age, who are school dropouts or not working, through activities such as sports,
debates, exhibitions and theatre to focus their energies on productive activities and prevent
them from being radicalized. HAKI also runs a program specifically geared towards engaging
at-risk women and counseling them against joining extremist groups. Young school girls and
women in college who are vulnerable to radicalization are the focus of this program. AWAPSA
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also lobbies directly on behalf of female Muslim students persecuted for wearing religious
headgear, hijab.50
Other programs facilitate increased participation of women in planning PCVE programs and
policies. For example, the COEC’s Mini Bus community dialogue program used a mini bus to
pick up women and others from the community to ensure they attended the organization’s
meetings to develop a charter on women against VE. 51 The mini bus picked up women
heading to work in the morning, and then dropped them to their respective places of work.52
It acted as a platform to bring women and other community members together to raise
awareness on women’s roles in PCVE and give recommendations on the proposed charter. 53
Still other direct interventions focus on providing social activities for youth who are thought
to be particularly at-risk of adopting violently extreme ideology. As a part of its efforts to
address violent extremism in Kenya, RUSI provides activities for youth in low-income Somali
neighborhoods. The Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (“UTIL”) expressed
interest in developing youth programming in the approximately 650 currently defunct youth
centers around Tunisia, as a way of providing access to sports, music, and film.54 In this
scheme, “monitors” at the centers—expected to be primarily women—would be trained to
identify at-risk youth.
In its most extreme form, direct intervention involves engaging those who are currently or
were very recently involved with violent extremism. UTIL had, on at least one occasion, taken
family members—and mothers in particular—to visit their sons in a Syrian prison. The
administration of UTIL believed that mothers’ close relationship with children makes their
engagement particularly useful in preventing young people from becoming involved or
continuing to associate with violent extremists.55 The expectation is that seeing their mothers
would inspire young detainees to turn forever from violent extremism.56
Considerations with Direct Interventions
Direct intervention programs run the risk of instrumentalizing women. A program like
WIFE that provides women counseling, but also expects them to play an active role in
dialogue with at-risk communities, may compel women to participate more actively in efforts
to address violent extremism than they might otherwise choose. This kind of quid pro quo
arrangement in which a service is provided in exchange for participation runs the risk of
pressuring women to engage in programs. This, in turn, may result in less successful
outcomes, where women are only participating in order to receive a service. There are several
ways to avoid these dynamics, such as providing the service independent of agreements to
participate or moderating the requirements so that women may choose to participate in the
PCVE program to varying degrees.
In addition, interventions that engage women solely because of their status as mothers, such
as UTIL’s arranging for mothers to visit their sons in prison, rely on gender stereotypes
that may perpetuate preconceptions of women as only relevant to PCVE efforts in their role
54

as caretakers. They may also color women’s own conceptions of the limited relevance of their
participation to efforts to address and prevent violent extremism. As programs that involve
parents may be quite helpful in efforts to combat extremism, there are various
implementation considerations that could minimize the negative impact on women caused
by focusing solely on their identity as mothers. Programs could involve women and men
equally as fathers and mothers. Programs that focus on mothers could have added elements
that empower women as women and/or engage women as mothers but also in their other
social, economic and cultural capacities.
Many of the direct intervention programs encountered could better ensure women’s
participation. For example, it was unclear whether women and girls had access to
mentoring programs on an equal basis with men and boys, although at least one program
was geared specifically towards young women.57 The same can be said of efforts to provide
youth with social and cultural opportunities. While at least one organization arranges
sporting events for girls in rural areas, it is unclear whether other programs—established or
nascent—make efforts to include girls and women in these sorts of cultural opportunities. 58
In these circumstances, young women and girls may have a difficult time otherwise
participating without affirmative efforts to include them.
COMMUNITY DIALOGUE
Many community dialogue programs encountered by researchers have a religious component
and seek to reduce tensions between those of different faiths. In Kenya, AWAPSA’s “Friends
Without Borders” program brings Christian and Muslim women from Madrassah together to
discuss their differences and to present counter narratives.59 Women are the focus of this
program, as they are increasingly seen as a stabilizing force in the community. 60 RUSI
conducts a similar program, working with whole communities to hold discussions about
spiritual and ethnic differences, suspected to fuel some types of violent extremism. In
Tunisia, the Ministry of Human Rights, with support from the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP), hosted a three day-long conference to bring imams and popular youth
bloggers together from five nations to create dialogue around presenting violent extremism
through social networks, as part of the Ministry’s “plateforme de contrediscourse.”61 Other
community dialogue programs aim to bring community members together with law
enforcement. These efforts will be discussed in the next Section on community policing.
Considerations with Community Dialogue
While women appear to be involved in various community dialogue programs, one potential
consideration is ensuring women’s participation in dialogue programs across genders. It
appears that some dialogue programs may involve women dialoguing with each other but it
is also important to provide a forum in which women’s voices can be prominent in the
community at large. Similarly, it is important to ensure, where appropriate, that women
participating in all-female dialogue programs are provided with the skills and tools to
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communicate their positions and perspectives outside of the program so that such
conversations are not limited to the program space.
COMMUNITY POLICING
In Tunisia and Kenya, some interviewees expressed skepticism about the feasibility of
community policing programs, citing the difficult relationship between state security and
marginalized communities, the latter having repeatedly been the target of due process and
other human rights violations. In Tunisia, stakeholders noted that it was likely to take time
to develop relationships between community and police due to frequent abuses by police and
the resulting very low levels of confidence of marginalized communities in the police. 62
Despite this, others expressed some optimism about community policing as a goal, at least in
theory, particularly if effectuated through security forces that have favorable relationships
with the surrounding communities.63 Yet others believed effective community policing may
even serve to reduce violent extremism, to the extent that some extremism is catalyzed by
abusive security measures.64
In Tunisia, for several years, UNDP supported community policing workshops for local
security forces and the rehabilitation of some buildings in a dozen community policing
stations.65 The Ministry of the Interior may replicate these stations in the future.66 In Kenya,
community policing programs, geared towards detecting violent extremism, are already
underway. AWAPSA facilitates roundtable discussions between women in the community
and law enforcement, to build trust between the two groups and to encourage women to share
information about extremism in their own communities. The Kenyan Ministry of the
Interior’s community policing efforts—in its most recent iteration, known as Nyumba Kumi—
sought to bring together small groups of community members to share their concerns with
police. However, these efforts, according to one reporter, “have yielded little fruit.”67 This is
due in large part to the acute lack of trust between targeted communities and security forces
in the country.
KECOSCE is also implementing Countering Violent Extremism through building stronger,
more resilient local communities in the coast of Kenya in Mombasa, Kwale and Lamu counties.
68 The program aims to improve relations between law enforcement and youth through
engagement and empowerment activities such as youth discussion forums where police
officials are also participants.
Considerations with Community Policing Programs
Because police forces in Tunisia and Kenya are overwhelmingly staffed by men, community
policing programs tend to have quite defined gender dynamics. The police that participate
are mostly male while community members may be male or female. These dynamics should
be taken into account in constructing the framework for the dialogue in ensuring women’s
voices are not marginalized. Alternately, some community policing programs may focus on
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female officers engaging with a community. This has its own issues in that often women
police officers have little influence in the department at large and thus any policies or
approaches they may have learned in the engagements may not be effectively communicated
or mainstreamed within the department. Such programs could include components that
empower female officers within the departments.
CAPACITY BUILDING
Local civil society organizations, with support from USAID and UNDP in Kenya, are
implementing programs to build community and individual capacity in an effort to reduce
vulnerability to violent extremism. USAID’s “Strengthening Community Resilience against
Extremism” program supports civil-society organizations “working on conflict and countering
violent extremism (CVE) in the six counties on the Kenyan coastal region.”69 Coast Education
Center (“COEC”) is one of eight local organizations receiving USAID assistance to strengthen
its advocacy and operations to address violent extremism. 70 USAID’s Kenya Transition
Initiative–Eastleigh (“KTI-E”) provides support to organizations in the predominantly Somali
neighborhood in Nairobi for programs that build capacity among youth and community for
moderation and non-violence, empower the local youth, and provide livelihood support for
youth. 71 Act Change Transform (“ACT!”) is a grant management agency that supports
partner organizations working in “peacebuilding and conflict transformation.”72 ACT! also
offers grantees “technical assistance” and “organizational development” services. The
objective of these kinds of grants is to build the capacity of local actors to effectively address
violent extremism in their communities.
Muslim organizations are also engaged in training of religious leaders and clerics to counter
radicalization efforts. In this regard, BRAVE has developed a training manual, which
includes an “Early Warning Against Radicalization and Violent Extremism” tool that
attempts to identify “early warning signs of radicalization and violent extremism.” 73
Similarly, the Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya (“CIPK”), through its vast network
of Muslim clerics and regular training of its members, aims to “protect their mosques from
being used by extremist preachers and to include the youth in their mosque committees.”74
Local organizations are also involved in capacity building of law enforcement on PCVE,
Strengthening Resilience to Violent Extremism in the Horn of Africa (“STRIVE”) program
being implemented by RUSI involves capacity building and training of mid-level and senior
law enforcement managers working in high risk areas on PCVE.75
Locally supported programs are also engaged in capacity building efforts. One organization
in Tunisia has developed programming aimed at educating female police officers about their
rights and responsibilities under Resolution 1325 and encouraging them to seek promotions
within their departments.76 The same organization’s “Peace Ambassador” program selects
women in equal proportion to men for training and assistance in developing region-specific
programs addressing violent extremism.77
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Considerations with Capacity Building Programs
Community capacity building programs appear to receive significant external donor funding.
One possible area of concern is that external donors tend to fund more well-established
organizations for administrative and technical convenience. Researchers noted that, at least
in Tunisia, some of the smaller less established organizations were directed by women. 78 As
such, it is possible that capacity building programs may fail to adequately ensure women’s
participation and leadership where external donors are not willing to support less
established female-lead organizations.
As with many programs, capacity building programs directed at women, such as female police
officers for example, can prompt backlash. Again, these concerns may be ameliorated by
providing at the outset groundwork to anticipate potential backlash, laying out the benefits
of capacity building to non-targets, building capacity of targets to respond to potential
backlash and providing resources in a thoughtful manner.
RETURNEE ASSISTANCE
Returnee assistance programs were limited in both Tunisia and Kenya. For example,
returnees were not accepted in a domestic violence shelter visited by researchers in Tunisia.79
Researchers in Kenya came across few programs that offered services to returnees.
Stakeholders there described government backlash against the returnees and local
organizations that assisted them.80 Some returnees have had their financial accounts frozen
and released only after court intervention. 81 Identifying returnees is a challenge in Kenya as
well. Returnees do not readily identify themselves due to fear of abduction and extra-judicial
killings perpetrated, according to one stakeholder, either by the state or by violent extremist
groups.82 Only one of the interviewed stakeholders worked with returnee women and had
differentiated between programs for “women left behind” and those for returnees.83
Researchers are concerned that the lack of returnee services risked marginalizing women
with connections to violent extremism. Without adequate support, already vulnerable women
may be driven to further desperation. This may be particularly true in prison, where women
may be held upon return.84 As noted above, it is unclear where female returnees are held and
what conditions they are subjected to in detention. However, the same concerns likely exist
as with the male returnee population of further radicalization in detention and reintegration
as well as concerns specific to women in the areas of reproduction and child care.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS
1.

ENSURE A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH IN DESIGN,
IMPLEMENTATION AND REVIEW OF PCVE EFFORTS THAT
SEPARATES PREVENTION FROM LAW ENFORCEMENT

By ratifying CEDAW, 189 state parties, including Tunisia and Kenya, have committed to
ensuring laws, policies and programs do not discriminate against women and that they
respect their basic rights. States have also committed to advancing women’s equality through
affirmative measures. PCVE programming is no exception.
A PCVE program that separates prevention programming from security oriented
programming is more likely to be human rights oriented. When programs combine law
enforcement with prevention goals, initiatives are less effective and undermine community
participation and relationships. If communities are only engaged within a security
framework, they are less likely to see themselves as partners, and more as targets of the
state. In both Kenya and Tunisia, stakeholders reported government action that potentially
violates women’s human rights through police harassment and raids, arbitrary detention,
disappearances and even extra judicial killings, among others. While some organizations in
Tunisia viewed the government as more human rights compliant in its approach, Kenyan
organizations uniformly expressed concern in this area. As reported, women detained in
Kenya for suspected terror attacks are not allowed to meet friends, family members or legal
representatives, are not given medical care, and only released upon payment of extremely
high monetary bonds.1
All counterterrorism and PCVE efforts should be reviewed for adverse human rights impacts,
including a detrimental impact on women’s equality. To ensure such programs are gendersensitive and gender-effective, programs should be designed and implemented in a manner
that protects women’s human rights and equality. Programs that fail to take a human rights
approach run the risk of advancing discrimination, instrumentalizing the rights of women,
marginalizing their input and participation and even promoting backlash against women.
Further, PCVE programs are opportunities to advance women’s equality through affirmative
measures. PCVE programming, when designed with women’s equality in mind, can provide
opportunities for women’s leadership and community engagement, capacity building,
economic and professional equality and access to education and skills training. These
opportunities should be considered and seized by the government and its partners in the
service of PCVE goals as well as overall social, economic, political state wellbeing.
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2.

PRIORITIZE GENDER-SENSITIVE AND GENDER-EFFECTIVE
STRATEGIES AND REFORMS IN THE SECURITY SECTOR

The security sector should review its strategies, plan and operations, including recruitment,
hiring, training, working practices and community engagement methods, for gender-related
considerations and human rights oriented reforms more generally. This would not only
ensure compliance with obligations under CEDAW but improve the operational effectiveness
of security sector PCVE efforts by ensuring they are responsive to the entire community
serviced and that they are engaging women as both partners and participants.
This review should have goals of developing a gender-inclusive security sector at all levels as
well as security practices that are gender-sensitive and gender-effective. A gender-inclusive
security sector should include increased recruitment and hiring of women at all levels as well
as development of an environment and practices that are inclusive, responsive to the
challenges women face in the security sector and promoting of women’s advancement and
leadership. Both Tunisia and Kenya suffer from significant underrepresentation of women
in law enforcement.
Gender-sensitive and gender-effective security practices include consideration and
assessment of women and gender equality in all aspects of security sector activities including
policing and detention. In the context of policing, considerations could include how police may
more effectively engage with female community members and build trust through
responsiveness, for example, to domestic violence situations. Considerations could also
include ensuring female detainees are detained in conditions that account for women’s
reproductive, maternal and psychological needs. Practices should be reviewed in light of
women’s social, economic, legal and cultural roles to determine how women’s needs may be
better served, how women may be better engaged as community partners and how women’s
recruitment may be more effectively addressed.
3.

SUPPORT BUILDING RESILIENT COMMUNITIES THAT ARE
INCLUSIVE, PROMOTE EQUALITY AND ENGAGE IN DIALOGUE
BETWEEN WOMEN AND GIRLS, MEN AND BOYS

Violent extremism inevitably impacts the economic, social, cultural and political well-being
of an entire community. Program elements should encourage strong communities that
protect community values and encourage recognition of women and girls as critical and equal
voices to men and boys. This kind of programming can lay the groundwork for other more
targeted prevention interventions and ensure communities can be equal partners in PCVE
efforts in the long-term.
Effective gender-sensitive and gender-effective approaches to PCVE require active
engagement of the entire community, including boys and men.2 In otherwise male-dominated
institutions such as police and local governments, engaging male leaders in promoting
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women’s presence is important to effectively creating space for women and girls and
developing sustainable inclusive and diverse environments. 3 Media and other public
education resources may be employed to promote male engagement with gender-sensitive
PCVE efforts by advancing, for example, non-discriminatory behavior or introducing nonviolent conflict resolution methods. In Kenya, husbands and other male family members
appear to have significant influence on women’s participation in programs because of
traditional and religious practices.4 Under these circumstances, educating men on the value
of increased women’s participation in PCVE will likely increase women’s presence in such
programs. Similarly, religious leaders may be influential in ensuring non-discrimination and
gender equality. For example, by implementing the Beirut Declaration and its 18
commitments on “Faith for Rights,” which specifically includes the pledge to revisit those
religious understandings and interpretations that appear to perpetuate gender inequality
and harmful stereotypes or even condone gender-based violence, women’s engagement in
PCVE efforts could be encouraged.5
4.

AVOID COUNTERPRODUCTIVE RELIANCE ON HARMFUL
STEREOTYPES AND TRADITIONAL GENDER ROLES

As noted, some PCVE programs rely on harmful stereotypes, such as equating women with
motherhood or conceiving of them solely as victims, which may result in promotion of
counterproductive and limiting traditional conceptions of women’s proper roles and identity.
This does not mean PCVE efforts may not engage with the social and cultural roles women
tend to play in many communities and families but it does mean such engagement should be
thoughtful and reflective, considerate of the costs and consequences to women’s equality, and,
where possible, inclusive of program components that seek to challenge or question
counterproductive stereotypes and traditional roles.
Stereotyping not only harms women but can undermine the success of PCVE programming.
For example, many programs make assumptions that mothers and wives have defined roles
in the family that may not reflect the reality of many families. Current studies measuring
the effectiveness of such programs often rely on self-evaluations by mothers, which reinforce
the idea that women have a special role within the family and have access to special
information. 6 However, these self-evaluations do not objectively indicate the efficacy of
utilizing women in PCVE programs. In fact, reports indicate that often children go to
extensive lengths to hide their participation from their mothers in particular.7
Moreover, women’s participation in preventing and identifying extremism in their
communities may be underutilized by assumptions of their roles. Women’s predisposition to
peace and/or tolerance, an example of another gender stereotype, may cause programs to be
badly targeted or less effective. These stereotypes about women create a barrier to
understanding women as affected by and as participants in violent extremism. Some policy
makers might assume that women do not utilize violence as a manner of expressing agency,
or that women only use violence in cases of self-defense. However, such a view ignores drivers
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of violent extremism that currently impact women, and categorizes women solely as victims,
or as apolitical actors, which ultimately hampers ongoing PCVE efforts.8 Ultimately, onedimensional depictions of women reinforce gendered stereotypes, and oversimplify analyses
of and responses to the full range of reasons women participate in violent extremism and can
participate in its prevention.9
5.

ENGAGE WOMEN AS CHANGE AGENTS AND CREATIVE LEADERS IN
ALL FORMS OF PROGRAMMING

Uniformly, women are being underutilized in efforts to prevent and counter violent
extremism. With the exception of programs implemented at women-led civil society
organizations, women are at most general participants or conduits for actual program
targets. As half of the population, women have significant potential to serve as change agents
in transforming factors that facilitate violent extremism. Maximizing this potential would
require gender-aware program development and for women to be equally involved in all levels
of programming from design to implementation to assessment of success. Towards this end,
UN Security Council Resolution (“UNSCR”) 1325 on Women, Peace and Security stresses the
importance of the equal participation and full involvement of women in this area and urges
states to increase women’s representation at all levels of the decision-making process for the
prevention, management and resolution of conflict.10
To fully engage women as change agents, it is imperative that women play leadership roles
in program design and conceptualization. Doing so ensures programming benefits from
women’s experience, knowledge and perspective about cultural, political and social dynamics
and conditions in their societies, communities and families. Programs that engage women
only at the implementation stage are more likely to rely on misguided or counterproductive
stereotypes and limited and narrow conceptualizations about women’s capabilities or
relationships. Moreover, involving women and gender issues in program design ensures
barriers and disincentives for women’s participation and leadership due to discrimination
and inequality are anticipated at the outset.
6.

EMPHASIZE CAPACITY BUILDING AND EDUCATIONAL ELEMENTS
OF PROGRAMS

For women to be effective participants and leaders in PCVE efforts, capacity-building and
education elements of programs should be emphasized. Where women are engaged in their
role as parents, for example, they cannot simply be expected to recognize early warning signs
of extremism without substantial education, training and program components that explore
effective communication with children, among other things. As interviewed program
directors themselves pointed out, it is difficult to identify “at-risk” individuals. 11 Even if
parents recognize extremist tendencies or sympathies in their children, they often lack the
skills needed to intervene. Women (and parents more generally) need to be equipped and
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supported in their efforts to prevent their children from joining extremist groups, and also to
build their own capacity to reject the influence of extremism and violence. Moreover,
programs that target mothers should consider engaging fathers as well. Not only will such
an engagement maximize parental intervention but also the support and involvement of the
father will likely facilitate efficacy of the mother’s actions.
Where possible and appropriate, programs focusing on women’s participation could consider
adding empowerment and education around religion. Interviewed stakeholders in Kenya
identified religious beliefs and religiously influenced socio-cultural norms as sometimes
socializing women from an early age to be subservient and heavily influenced by male family
members. Kenyan women, for example, felt obligated to “follow” their husbands to Somalia.12
Programs could engage religious leaders to introduce or share interpretations of Islam that
conceive of males and females in the context of equality.
7.

AVOID INSTRUMENTALIZING AND MARGINALIZING WOMEN’S
RIGHTS WHICH CAN UNDERMINE ENGAGEMENT AND SERVE AS A
LOST OPPORTUNITY TO PROMOTE WOMEN’S EQUALITY

PCVE programs that incorporate women’s rights and interests are also more likely to succeed
in engaging women and women’s organizations. Where PCVE programming engages women
solely in order to utilize them as a means of collecting information, for example, they are less
likely to successfully develop partnerships with women’s organizations if these organizations
perceive women’s rights as subsidiary to security concerns. 13 Leaders of women’s
organizations have also been reluctant to participate in counterterrorism programs because
such policy circles have little overlap with women’s groups and hold as the primary goal
security defined in military terms.14 Moreover, women’s organizations may perceive a cost to
participating in such programs. In cases such as the United Kingdom’s Prevent program,
participation in the program by women’s organizations fostered suspicion in the constituent
communities and decreased the trust between women’s groups and the communities in which
they worked.15
8.

EMPHASIZE TRANSPARENCY AND ONGOING EVALUATIONS OF
UNINTENDED DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF PCVE PROGRAMMING

As seen in the United States (see Appendix), there is often ambiguity and a lack of
transparency around program funding. Greater transparency regarding funding sources,
recipients of funding, evaluations of use of funds and whether the programs were deemed
effective should be included in ongoing program evaluations. The efficacy of PCVE efforts is
enhanced when women and girls are included in monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.
Gender-disaggregated data can provide a nuanced picture of the outputs and differential
impact of PCVE activities. 16 Gender-related indicators and baseline information should
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therefore be incorporated in the assessment of both general PCVE initiatives and those that
specifically seek to advance women and girls’ roles in PCVE.
9.

ADDRESS LAWS AND POLICIES THAT LIMIT AND COMPROMISE
WOMEN’S RIGHTS

Even programs that promote women’s rights and maximize women’s leadership will face
challenges in legal and political environments that limit women’s autonomy and/or fail to
promote equality. PCVE efforts should support the passage and implementation of laws and
policies that promote women’s equality, allowing women to act as change agents.
10.

CONSIDER NEW APPROACHES FOR RETURNEES, REHABILITATION
AND REINTEGRATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO PROSECUTION AND
DETENTION

As noted, research revealed a dearth of services and programs for women returnees. In fact,
in Tunisia, services directed towards women subjected to violence did not consider female
returnees as part of their client base. Programming should be developed to address the
complex issues around female returnees. As more and more women are successfully recruited
and subsequently return to their communities, there is an important opportunity to engage
with difficult questions and conduct an analysis of community and social conditions that may
have encouraged women to join extremist organizations and may now make it difficult or
impossible for them to rejoin their peers. Special attention should be paid to female returnees
who are detained, as it is unclear where female returnees are held and what conditions they
are subjected to in detention.
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS BY PROGRAM TYPE
1.

MEDIA CAMPAIGNS

Coordinators should undertake an evaluation of their own social and cultural climate,
including potential risks for participants, at the outset of media programming. Coordinators
should actively solicit the participation of women so that the same opportunities are available
to men and women. Programmers should make it clear to the communities in which they
operate that all individuals, including women, have important ideas and perspectives to bring
to the table and diverse roles to play in the battle against violent extremism. Careful
attention to messaging and plans that anticipate potential backlash are advisable.
Coordinators should follow an informed consent model for participation in media campaigns
or any other activity that poses special risks to participants. All participants should be
warned of foreseeable potential risks posed by participation, especially risks unique to their
demographic. Participants should only consent to participate after they have considered
these risks and found that participation is in their own interest.
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Coordinators should also consider addressing media campaigns to parents and family
members when attempting to intervene with at-risk youth. As one interviewee in Tunisia
noted, anti-drug campaigns in the United States that attempted to address young drug users
may have been more effective when those efforts were addressed to their parents.
2.

DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

Coordinators should undertake an evaluation of the local conditions, including potential
barriers to women’s access, before implementing a development program. Program
facilitators should take gender-specific barriers to access into account when delivering goods
or services, and consider whether special accommodations could lead to better distribution.
For example, facilitators may find that changing the time of day or the location of distribution
may increase women’s participation.
Program facilitators should review program implementation for indications that women are
either (a) not benefitting on an equal basis with men or (b) suffering backlash from
community members as a result of receiving development benefits. This might include
periodic surveys of local program participants, or data collection to allow program facilitators
to evaluate whether women are participating in the desired proportions, and if so, under
what conditions.
3.

DIRECT INTERVENTIONS

Developers should avoid exchanging goods or services for women’s participation in direct
intervention programs. This sort of quid pro quo arrangement may exert coercive pressure
on women to participate to a greater degree than they might otherwise choose.
Coordinators should generally ensure all programs are available on an equal basis to women
and girls. This is particularly true where women and girls may not be expected or welcome
to participate in the same numbers as men and boys. For example, if the local atmosphere is
such that women and girls may not feel welcome to participate in a youth sports program,
special efforts should be made to ensure their participation and to make them feel welcome.
Developers should take special care that direct intervention programs do not expose
vulnerable populations to violent extremist ideology, and in so doing risk the perpetuation of
violent extremism.
4.

COMMUNITY DIALOGUE

Coordinators should do their best to develop programs that provide women a meaningful
opportunity to contribute to conversations. Facilitators should actively encourage women’s
involvement and ensure the dialogue mechanism promotes women’s participation. In some
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communities, women’s spaces may be a good way to ensure that women have a meaningful
opportunity to express themselves.
5.

COMMUNITY POLICING

Community policing strategies are unlikely to successfully address conditions of violent
extremism unless the relationship between the police and the community is based on mutual
trust and respect. Programs that instrumentalize community members may further damage
the community’s relationship with security forces.
6.

CAPACITY BUILDING

As noted above, capacity building is an important element of many PCVE programs.
Programs that focus primarily on capacity building should have the dual goal of preventing
and countering violent extremism and promoting women’s equality. By considering both
goals simultaneously, these programs can avoid instrumentalizing women’s participation but
instead ensure that women are both active contributors and beneficiaries in PCVE efforts.
Moreover, by promoting women’s equality, program interventions are likely to be more
sustainable and have lasting effects as women develop their ability to become change agents
and leaders in the PCVE effort.
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TUNISIA COUNTRY PROFILE
Tunisia is widely recognized as one of the most progressive countries in the Arab world.
After a largely peaceful transition to democracy, Tunisia’s new constitution contains robust
human rights protections, including non-discrimination and gender equality provisions,
freedom of religion guarantees, due process protections, and various socio-economic rights.1
Tunisia has also signed on to various human rights treaties, further expressing its
commitment to human rights and protected freedoms.2
Nonetheless, Tunisia has recently been the target of various terrorist attacks and has
responded with security policies and practices that concern human rights activists. More
youth travel abroad to join violent extremist groups from Tunisia than perhaps from any
other country; some estimates indicate that 7,000 people, mostly youth, have left Tunisia to
join violent extremist groups since the conflict began. 3 With approximately half of its
population under thirty, 4 developing a response to violent extremism that honors its
expressed commitment to gender equality and human rights poses a difficult challenge for
Tunisia.
These complex dynamics have made Tunisia an interesting case study for this research. This
profile explores how Tunisia’s commitment to protecting human rights, and more specifically,
women’s rights, intersects with its approach to preventing and countering violent extremism.
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN TUNISIA
Violent extremism and recruitment for violent extremist groups has increased steadily in
Tunisia since the Revolution in 2011.5 That same year, Tunisia experienced four significant
terror events. In 2013, these events were followed by an attempt to bomb the seaside towns
of Sousse and Monastir.6 In 2015, several deadly attacks occurred: an attack at the Bardo
National Museum that resulted in twenty lives lost (including seventeen tourists),7 an attack
on the Sousse beaches resulting in thirty-nine deaths,8 and a suicide bombing in Tunis which
“killed [twelve] members of the presidential guard.”9 In recent years, many attacks have been
linked to the Islamic State (also “ISIS,” “ISIL,” or “Daesh”). 10 Most recently, Tunisian
extremists have been accused of perpetrating violence in France, including the 2015 massacre
at Charlie Hebdo and the 2016 Bastille Day attack in Nice.11
The southern and central regions of the Tunisia are thought to be particularly vulnerable to
extremism, due in part to their proximity to the instability in Libya.12 In addition to the
approximately 7,000 Tunisians who have left the country to join extremist organizations
abroad,13 estimates indicate that about 3,000 Tunisians are currently fighting with violent
extremist groups14 and approximately 700–800 trained fighters have returned to Tunisia.15
With more Tunisians joining extremist organizations abroad, dual concerns regarding state
security and the protection of human rights and civil liberties have surfaced. The Tunisian
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government has increased its security efforts aimed at combatting extremism, including an
updated antiterrorism law, extending some police powers such as pre-trial detention time,
and lifting a halt on the death penalty.16 But organizations such as Human Rights Watch
and Amnesty International, among others, have expressed concerns about the human rights
consequences of these efforts. 17 Namely, concerns are that people have been questioned,
searched, and detained in the absence of any credible evidence linking them to terrorism,
sometimes with convictions secured by confessions that were extracted largely through
torture.18
VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND WOMEN
While significantly fewer Tunisian women join violent extremist organizations than men,
Tunisia has a relatively large proportion of female fighters in comparison to other countries.19
Reports estimate as many as 700 women have joined extremist groups.20 This means that
around 10 percent of people who have left Tunisia to join foreign fighters are women. The
government has estimated that 100-500 women have left the country specifically for “sexual
jihad,” but civil society organizations put the number closer to 300–400.21
As more than one activist noted, female participants in violent extremism are often
characterized as victims, citing examples of deception and forced sexual services, but the
perception that women are only joining organizations under coercive circumstances has
slowly eroded. 22 In fact, some have speculated that women are actively recruited by
organizations because they are less likely to be suspected by authorities.23 Some suggest that
women may be particularly good recruits because they may commit more readily and
ardently to extremist ideology than men.24 One trend appears to be to recruit middle-class,
educated women. 25 According to stakeholders, women actively participate in extremist
activities, by serving as look-outs, recruiting other members in person or online, assisting
with information technology and computers or otherwise supporting their plans.26
Women are likely recruited by the same means as men—through social media, friends and
mosques.27 Women are also often recruited through association with male family members
who have joined extremist organizations.28 Additionally, young women may be introduced to
extremist groups through romantic partners.29
DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Stakeholders in Tunisia posit a number of driving forces of violent extremism that may lead
to the adoption of these views. While opinions vary greatly on this issue, some common
themes in Tunisia are: the breakdown of the family unit; violence in the family; economic
incentives; breakdown of the Tunisian national identity; and abuses by the security state.30
The breakdown of the family unit was cited by those interviewed by researchers as a potential
factor in decisions to leave Tunisia to join foreign fighters. Stakeholders believed that
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parental influence has eroded in Tunisian society.31 They suggested that teenagers have a
difficult time communicating openly with their parents, which has led them to talk more to
peers in person or online.32 Unsurprisingly, social media recruitment by extremist groups is
relatively common in Tunisia, because of these changing communication patterns.33
Violence in the family was also identified as potential reason for high recruitment of foreign
fighters from Tunisia. As a current study indicates, Tunisian children are exposed to physical
and verbal violence within the family unit or at school, usually within the context of
disciplinary practices. 34 In fact, 94 percent of children aged 4–18 reported exposure to
violence in some form in Tunisian society, according to the study. 35 UNICEF Tunisia
theorizes that exposure to childhood violence may desensitize Tunisians to the violence
associated with extremist groups. 36 Research generally supports this theory, with research
finding that children exposed to physical punishment are more likely to engage in violent
behavior later in life.37
Economic incentives are considered relevant to many people’s decisions to assist and join
violent extremist groups. High unemployment rates in Tunisia, especially in many of the
rural areas closest to the Libyan border, are thought to encourage extremism.38 Extremist
groups will compensate people for material assistance, such as the provision of food, or even
offer salaries to people who join the group full time.39 In Tunisia, this economic benefit can
be appealing to a wide range of people; it is relatively common for educated people not to be
able to find skilled work in Tunisia.40 There are high unemployment rates in Tunisia; one
study suggested that as many as 35 percent of people aged 25–29 are unemployed.41 Some
researchers speculate that an education bubble has burst in Tunisia, with many recent
college graduates unable to find work.42 This may be a particular problem in rural areas.
Stakeholders report that women do most of types of menial work in rural areas, and that men
feel that this kind of work is beneath them.43 As a result, rural men in particular often cannot
find skilled work and sometimes will resort to assisting or joining extremist groups. 44
Another stakeholder believed that men see women as the cause of their unemployment
problems, and may join extremist groups that advocate divesting women of their rights and
economic opportunities.45 Such a divestment would theoretically open the jobs that women
currently hold to men, giving them yet another economic motivation to join extremist
groups.46
The breakdown of Tunisian national identity is another potential factor that may influence
Tunisians to join violent extremist groups. According to one stakeholder, many young people
view themselves as Muslim first and Tunisian second, indicating a higher sense of affiliation
and identification with religion than country.47 Some stakeholders thought that this identity
crisis was a natural part of the revolution. 48 Other stakeholders thought that extremist
rhetoric is especially appealing to youth in this moment, as rebellion against the state offers
one way of defining themselves.49 A few stakeholders suggested that young people have lost
their faith in the state, either because they did not see the changes they were promised after
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the revolution, or because they are being actively victimized by the government and state
security measures.50
Finally, abuses by the security state may be pushing people toward extremist organizations.
As explained later in the report, police often arbitrarily detain or arrest people because of
their associations with certain mosques, imams, or other individuals who are suspected of
extremist activity. 51 This victimization of communities by the government is thought to
contribute to the breakdown of national identity, pride, and loyalty to the country. Another
potential problem stakeholders identified is radicalization in prison. It appears that Tunisia
does not currently have a system for separating prisoners that adequately isolates violent
extremists, so that returning foreign fighters are housed in the general population. This
exposes the general population to violent extremists and their rhetoric, and converts prisons
into recruitment centers for violent extremist groups.52
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN TUNISIA
As noted, women’s equality has historically been an important element of Tunisian identity.53
Tunisia gained its independence from France in 1956, under the leadership of Habib
Bourguiba. Only three months after the country declared its independence, the Code of
Personal Status was promulgated.54 The Code was seen by many as a victory for women’s
rights in Tunisia: it abolished polygamy, replaced repudiation55 with legal divorce, available
to both genders on an equal basis, and ended “matrimonial guardianship.”56 In 1993, the Code
was expanded. 57 The expanded Code replaced paternal authority with shared parental
authority that required the consent of both the mother and father before a minor could marry,
allowed a woman to obtain full guardianship after divorce, and permitted her to represent
her children in legal matters. 58 Article 23 of the Code describes the concept of mutual
“benevolence” in marriage.59 Tunisian women have enjoyed the most progressive laws and
rights in the Arab region,60 including reproductive and family planning rights, both of which
were actively promoted by the Bourguiba administration.61
Tunisia’s 2014 Constitution reflects its long-standing dedication to ensuring gender equality.
The Preamble to the 2014 Constitution expresses “respect for . . . human rights, . . . [and] the
equality of rights and duties between all citizens, male and female.”62 Article 21 guarantees
a positive right to “equal rights and duties,” and “equal[ity] before the law without any
discrimination,” to “[a]ll citizens, male and female.”63 In Article 34, the state expresses its
intention to “guarantee women’s representation in elected bodies.”64 Article 40 obliges the
state to “take necessary measures” to ensure employment nondiscrimination.65 Article 74
contemplates female candidates for President of the Republic. 66 In Article 46 of the
Constitution, the state commits to taking affirmative measures to “protect women’s accrued
rights and work to strengthen and develop those rights” including gender equality within
government and elected bodies as well as the eradication of violence against women.67 To this
end, one of the most progressive, complete draft laws on domestic violence in the Arab world
is currently being debated in the legislature.68
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INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS ON WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS
Tunisia’s treaty ratifications are aligned with its commitment to women’s rights. Tunisia’s
constitution states that treaties and international law are the supreme law of the country.69
Tunisia ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (“CEDAW”) in 198570 and, in 2014, lifted all reservations to CEDAW. In the 2010
report from the CEDAW Committee on Tunisia, the Committee expressed concern over the
rise in incidents of violence against women, and urged the Tunisian legislature to create a
law that would clearly define and criminalize all forms of violence against women, especially
including protections for women wearing the hijab from harassment by public and private
individuals.71 The Committee also expressed concerns about women’s political participation,
education and literacy. However, the Committee was especially concerned with allegations
of arbitrary arrest and harassment against non-governmental organizations and human
rights defenders which can weaken protections more generally for women.72 The Committee
still regards Tunisia as a model of gender equality for most other Muslim and Arab
countries.73
As a party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”),74 Tunisia
is also committed to respecting the rights of those accused of crimes and those imprisoned or
held in detention, which can include women suspects.75 In the 2008 ICCPR report on Tunisia,
the ICCPR Human Rights Committee expressed concern about the broad definition of
terrorism in Tunisia’s criminal code, citing potential violations of Article 6 (right to life),
Article 7 (right against torture and degrading treatment) and Article 14 (rights of accused
persons).76 Tunisia is also a party to the Convention Against Torture, which it ratified in 1988
with no reservations.77 The definition of torture in the convention is relatively broad,78 and
accusations have been leveled against the government under the treaty for torture and
mistreatment during detention of violent extremist suspects, including women who are
suspected returning foreign fighters.79
CURRENT WOMEN’S RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TUNISIA
Following its report to the CEDAW Committee, Tunisia reaffirmed the state’s commitment
to “take all necessary measures in order to eradicate violence against women.” 80 The
government has taken some steps in this direction. It has conducted a comprehensive study
on violence against women from 2006–2009, spearheaded a program entitled “Gender
Equality and Prevention of Violence against Women” in 2006, and created a national strategy
to help address the prevention of gender based violence.81 In August 2004, the Penal Code
was amended to criminalize sexual harassment.82 However, problems persist despite these
steps to eradicate gendered violence. In 2010, one article suggested that 47.6 percent of
Tunisian women between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four had experienced some form of
violence.83 A 2015 report suggests that one in six of these women have experienced sexual
violence.84 Studies have found a correlation between this spike in gendered violence and the
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revolution. A 2014 study found “a marked increase in violence against women, including
sexual violence, since the revolution. According to the police’s own statistics, 46 women were
killed in the first ten months of 2013 (as compared to thirty-four for the same period in 2012).
90 percent of these crimes were committed by the victim’s partner.”85
Stakeholders managing a domestic violence shelter and service center note that “legislative
responses to violence [against women] remain largely insufficient.”86 A serious gap in the
current Penal Code, reported by Amnesty International, “allow[s] men accused of raping a
girl or woman aged between 15 and 20 to escape prosecution by marrying their victim,”87 and
reforms “continue[ ] to reflect discriminatory social attitudes against women and [fail to]
preserve the general needs of survivors.” 88 The prejudices of judges, traditional attitudes
regarding gender roles within the home, and high standards of proof may also act as
aggravating factors in the effective prosecution of perpetrators of violence against women.89
The Guardian reports that, between 2012 and 2013, “two-thirds of the 5,575 complaints of
marital violence lodged with the authorities were withdrawn or dismissed; only 10% resulted
in convictions.” 90 The publication also observed that “police may refuse to investigate
complaints and allegations—and sometimes they are the perpetrators.”91
Another significant restriction of women’s rights manifests in the context of religious
expression. President Habib Bourguiba referred to veils as “wretched rag[s]” and “dreadful
shroud[s],” and was criticized for mocking the religious concept of virginity.92 Bourguiba also
banned the niqab93 in schools, and “[o]nce, on camera, [ ] removed a hair-covering from a
woman in the street.” 94 Bourguiba’s successor communicated a similar stance towards
women’s religious expression; President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali “once reportedly said that
the hijab95 was something foreign and not part of Tunisian culture,”96 and, “[u]nder Ben Ali,
visible signs of faith, such as a man’s beard or a woman’s niqab, became cause for harassment
by security forces.”97 Tunisian society appears to have a complex relationship with women’s
religious expression, particularly in its discomfort with their religious garb. Research
exploring cultural attitudes in Tunisia suggests that, while “Tunisians are now generally
very tolerant of religious dress that might be considered moderate, like the hijab . . . the vast
majority of citizens describe themselves as still ‘completely against’ the wearing of more
dramatic religious attire like the niqab.”98 The Pew Research Center reported in 2016 that
“Tunisia is the only country in the Arab world and Africa where women report being harassed
for dressing too liberally and too conservatively.”99
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
The government response to the increasing threat of violent extremism has been primarily
security based. In 2015, Tunisia passed an updated antiterrorism law, in the wake of the
Bardo attack, which “extend[ed] some police powers such as pre-trial detention time, and
lift[ed] a halt on [the] death penalty.” 100 The law grants security forces broad and vague
monitoring and surveillance powers; extends incommunicado detention (where the detainee
is prohibited from communicating externally) from six to up to fifteen days for terrorism
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suspects, during which time detainees cannot see a lawyer or family members, and cannot go
before a judge; permits courts to close hearings to the public; and allows witnesses to remain
anonymous to the defendants. 101 Human rights workers characterize these measures as
restrictions of due process that violate many of Tunisia’s constitutional and international
obligations.102
The law also creates a National Commission on Counterterrorism, a joint commission
designed to bring together members of different ministries to advise on future laws and
design counterterrorism methods. 103 While the Commission can incorporate civil society
organizations, they have not yet been added as members. The Parliament also created a
Commission on the Recruitment of fighters, with members from the Ministry of Justice,
Interior, and Defense, to further investigate the processes by which people are connected to
extremist groups.104 It is unclear whether these new bodies will bolster the human rights
aspects of current national programs.
Other due process violations that are frequently reported include arbitrary raids, house
arrests105 and detentions, especially for those suspected of extremist activity.106 There are an
estimated 1,500 returning foreign fighters in prison in Tunisia.107 Most alarmingly, Amnesty
International has found evidence that security forces frequently torture detainees during
both interrogation and detention.108
Furthermore, under the guise of increasing security concerns, the Ministry of the Interior
announced in 2014 that “it would introduce stricter controls on the niqab.”109 According to
the Ministry, such controls are necessary because “suspects and fugitives deliberately wear
niqab for disguise and to escape from security units.”110 As of April 2016, Tunisia did not
appear to officially regulate women’s religious dress,111 but draft legislation was submitted
to Parliament on March 18, 2016—the one-year anniversary the Bardo attack112—that would
ban the niqab in public places.113 The 2016 bill was passed into law on July 5, 2019.114
Despite these findings, some organizations perceive the government as more receptive to
taking a human rights approach in addressing violent extremism than other governments.
According to one interviewee, Tunisia stands out as being one of the first governments to
recognize that approaches to counterterrorism must be multifaceted—including education,
media, restrictions on hate speech, the judiciary and social policies, to name a few examples.
However, public perceptions of the risk of violent extremism—undoubtedly stoked by media
coverage of these events—have made it more difficult to maintain a human rights approach
to counterterrorism.
As part of its broader strategy to combat violent extremism, the Tunisian government has
also focused on the regulation of mosques. In Tunisia, mosques must be registered by law
with the Ministry of Religious Affairs, but around 20 percent of mosques fell out of
government control as a result of the revolution.115 In addition, “[c]lose to 200 new mosques
[were] built without a license,” meaning that they were not properly registered with the
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government. 116 The Ministry believes that “[m]any of these mosques came under the
influence of groups espousing extremist interpretations of Islam.” 117 The Ministry is now
working closely with imams, taking an active role in monitoring the content of meetings and
services, and censoring hate speech and political discussion.118 However, concerns have been
expressed that the Ministry has made control of mosques largely a police responsibility,
focusing on security, rather than education and dialogue.119
For similar reasons, the stakeholders, including the Ministry of Women, Family, and
Children, have advocated for licensure of early childhood education centers. Currently,
preschools and schools for children under the age of five are unregulated by the
government.120 Partners of the Ministry have expressed concern that unlicensed centers may
teach extreme religious ideology by extoling the virtues of female genital mutilation, coercing
very small girls to cover themselves, allowing children to play with fake weapons, and
teaching them to sing extreme songs.121
Unofficial travel restrictions to destinations outside Tunisia has been another government
strategy for discouraging extremism. Men and women under the age of thirty-five were, until
recently, not permitted to travel without the explicit consent of their parents.122 These travel
restrictions were implemented unofficially, arbitrarily, and often with little basis, according
to stakeholders. 123 There have been reports that passport registration has also been
decentralized, making it significantly harder to complete necessary paperwork.124 Reports
indicate that the Ministry of the Interior has been barring specific individuals from travel
abroad, and even ordering their arrest, through “S-10” and “S-17” forms, unofficial
government travel approval mechanisms. Though reports have come from various sectors,
there has been no confirmation or government acknowledgment of their existence.125
The government also launched a media campaign called Ghodwa khir (“Tomorrow will be
better”) in March 2016.126 This program aimed to “promote Islam’s real, moderate values”
through the dissemination of “recorded sermons and religious seminars” available on the
web, “awareness programs on public and private radio and television stations,” a helpline
“for youths with questions about religion” and classes in mosques supervised by “authorized
imams and preachers.”127
NON-GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Civil society in Tunisia has turned its attention towards extremism and established various
programs to address it. A summary of programming of stakeholders IHCHR engaged with
during the 2017 field visit follows. This list is meant to be representative and not
exhaustive.
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UNION DES TUNISIENS INDÉPENDANTS POUR LA LIBERTÉ
Union des Tunisiens Indépendants pour la Liberté (“UTIL”) is a civil society organization
that primarily works on political participation and democracy building in Tunisia. Its work
in PCVE programs falls into three main categories: 1) media campaigns, 2) direct intervention
in prisons, and 3) direct intervention through youth engagement. UTIL’s media campaign
distributes debates and lessons on Islam, lessons on Tunisian history and culture, and
testimonials by family members of foreign fighters, in order to present counter narratives
and provide moderate education. UTIL has also facilitated at least one meeting between
parents and their children detained for suspected participation in extremist activities abroad.
UTIL explained this kind of direct intervention with suspected extremists abroad can have a
de-radicalizing effect. UTIL is also in the process of developing a direct intervention program
for youth. There are currently about 650 defunct and underutilized young centers around
Tunisia, and UTIL is working to help fund and direct social and cultural programming to
give youth access to sports, music and film.128
UNION NATIONALE DE LA FEMME TUNISIENNE
The Union Nationale de la Femme Tunisienne (“UNFT”) is a women’s rights advocacy
organization that has had a longstanding historical influence on the development of women’s
rights in Tunisia. Relevant to the prevention of violent extremism, this group is the driving
force behind a monthly rural women’s assistance program. UNFT’s development program
provides material assistance to women, such as clothing, furniture, and other forms of
economic assistance. It also provides professional skills development, which can include
training in sewing, embroidery, weaving, leather work or agricultural skills, such as small
animal care and beekeeping, as well as hosting sporting events for younger girls. UNFT
estimates that about 60–70 women participate at each event. UNFT believes that one of the
main drivers of violent extremism is poverty, and believe that their program, which both
economically assists these communities and develops their professional skills, has real
potential to decrease violent extremism.
INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
The International Institute for Human Development (“IIHD”) has three primary counter
violent extremist programs: (1) Women for Peace and Security (“W4PS”); (2) 1325 Trainings;
and (3) direct intervention through youth engagement. The W4PS program is part media
campaign and part capacity building. IIHD hopes to eventually train two men and two
women from each district or community across Tunisia to act as “peace ambassadors” and
community leaders to communicate with others who have been personally impacted by
extremist activities.129 After attending a day and a half training about the causes of violent
extremism and different international counter extremism models, IIHD supports the peace
ambassadors as they develop region-specific counter extremism action plans. The program
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also engages these ambassadors to produce a media campaign, comprised of a series of short
films that detail how terrorism has impacted their lives.
The 1325 Trainings are capacity building training sessions for police women, aimed at
empowering them and educating them about UN Security Counsel Resolution 1325, which
urges all state actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender
perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. IIHD hopes to encourage female
police officers to actively seek promotions so that women can have more say in the
development of counterterrorism and security strategies. IIHD has held one 1325 Training
conference and held half day trainings dedicated to educating Tunisian female police officers
about the resolution. It believes that building these officers’ capacity will allow them to more
actively participate in national counterterrorism programs and strategies, and that women’s
participation will help make these strategies more effective.130
INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) Tunisia recently spearheaded a media campaign called “No
to Terrorism, Yes to Human Rights,” which primarily consisted of videos communicating the
potential negative consequences of security measures against ordinary Tunisians.131 While
this is a not intuitively a PCVE program, its goal was to improve state and security relations
by improving the state’s ability to effectively engage in programs and prevention efforts with
a human-rights focus. The videos featured four subjects: a filmmaker, a traveler, a woman
hurt by crossfire and an individual who was wrongfully detained. The preliminary results
were positive, with a measurable decrease in attacks against and criticisms of human rights
groups. As the director noted, however, the real test will come if and when Tunisia
experiences another significant terror event as backlash against human rights organizations
could occur. On television, HRW has been called “Zionist,” “US-backed,” and “traitors with a
hidden agenda.”132 On social media, the Human Rights Watch is sometimes referred to as the
“Terrorist Rights Watch.”133
The United Nations Development Program (“UNDP”) is supporting the government on two
different PCVE programs.134 The first is focused on community policing135 and consists of
workshops for local security forces, and the rehabilitation of some office buildings into “model
stations.”136 UNDP has also hosted a three day conference that brought together popular
youth bloggers and imams in community dialogue, allowing them to talk about social media
and violent extremist rhetoric.137
*

*

*

In Tunisia, civil society organizations appear to be taking laudable steps to address the threat
of violent extremism in a more nuanced and holistic way. While the government has focused
primarily on security approaches to violent extremism, civil society actors appear to be filling
in the gaps. However, most of these projects are in the nascent stages, and it remains to be
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seen whether critical funding and resources needed to carry them through their first years
will materialize. In addition, Tunisian efforts addressing violent extremism appear not to
address the needs of returnees—that is, while Tunisian civil society has begun to concern
itself with “preventing” violent extremism, it does not seem similarly poised to “counter” it.
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KENYA COUNTRY PROFILE
Violent extremism poses a serious threat to Kenya. Although the country has faced threats
from domestic groups, Somali-based Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (“Al Shabab”) and,
more recently, the Islamic State (also, “ISIS,” “ISIL” or “Daesh”) are the major perpetrators
of violent extremism and radicalization in the country today. The government has
predominantly taken an aggressive approach to terror threats and radicalization efforts.
Kenyan authorities’ counter-terrorism effort includes religious and ethnic profiling of Kenyan
Somalis, extra-judicial killings and arbitrary arrests by the Anti-Terror Police Unit.
Unfortunately, these efforts have, in some cases, served to “push” individuals toward
radicalization. As a result, Kenya is now attempting a more inclusive, “softer” approach
through its National Countering Violence Extremism Strategy. This includes working with
civil society organizations to address the driving reasons behind radicalization.
Notwithstanding these efforts, significant steps still must be taken to break the cycle of
radicalization, and to implement effective PCVE strategies at the regional level.
This Section explores how Kenya’s commitment to protecting human rights and more
specifically, women’s rights intersects with its approach to preventing and countering violent
extremism
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA
A host of factors make Kenya vulnerable to domestic and transnational violent extremism.
These include the country’s ethnic composition, lack of internal political stability, geography,
unstable neighbors, as well as Islamic fundamentalism, poverty and ineffective law
enforcement. On the domestic front, the threat of violent extremism in the country is due to
several small-scale militant factions. The most prominent of these factions is the MRC, which
advocates for the city of Mombasa’s secession from Kenya.1 Law enforcement agencies held
MRC responsible for the attack on a popular Italian-owned casino in Malinidi in March 2013
that claimed eight lives.2 Terrorist attacks have had a devastating impact on Kenya’s tourism
industry, which provides a vital source of jobs and income for the country. The Kenya Tourism
Board has estimated a 25 percent drop in tourism due to terrorism.3 In one case, hundreds of
British tourists were evacuated from beach resorts near Mombasa in May 2014, following
warnings from the Foreign Office.4
International groups—Al-Qaida’s affiliate in Somalia, Al-Shabab, and more recently the
Islamic State—are now the greatest threats to Kenya’s security. Al-Shabab has been fighting
an insurgency in Somalia for more than a decade. Al-Shabab has targeted Kenya for the
country’s role in the global war on terror and its 2011 military invasion of Somalia as part of
the African Union Forces in Somalia (“AMISOM”). 56 Between 2011 and 2015 alone, more
than 200 attacks targeting markets, night-clubs, and places of worships with explosives or
automatic weapons were linked to Al-Shabab. 7 The group claimed responsibility for the
September 2013 attack on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping mall, a symbol of Kenya’s prosperity.
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More than 60 people were killed, including women and children, and more than 150 were
wounded during a four-day siege.8 Al-Shabab also has a history of executing bold military
attacks against armed forces personnel and the government. In January 2016, it claimed to
have killed more than 100 Kenyan soldiers during a raid conducted at the AMISOM base in
Somalia. It released propaganda video footage of the raid in April 2016.9
Kenya has also become a prime location for Al-Shabab’s recruitment and radicalization
efforts.10 The group targets recent converts to Islam, particularly residing in the coastal areas
of the country. Typically described as “young” and “zealous,” these converts can be difficult
to detect and monitor, as they blend in easily with the general population. It was estimated
in December 2014 that 25 percent of Al-Shabab personnel were Kenyan. 11 Elgiva Bwire
Oliacha represents a well-known example of this kind of homegrown violent extremism. The
28-year-old Kenyan national pled guilty to a grenade attack in Nairobi that wounded over
two dozen people.12 He proclaimed that he was a member of Al-Shabab in court and was
sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Islamic State has also starting making inroads in Kenya. It operates online and in
universities, and has become effective in recruitment.13 Rashid Abdi, senior analyst at the
International Crisis Group think tank in Nairobi, contends that “there is now a real threat
that Kenya faces from ISIS, and the danger will continue to increase.”14 The statement is
corroborated by the Kenyan intelligence agencies estimates in 2016 that around 100 men and
women went to Syria and Libya to join ISIS.15
WOMEN AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN KENYA
Al-Shabab and ISIS16 are increasingly targeting women to radicalize and engage them as
fighters in the region.17 Women were involved in the Al-Shabab’s September 2016 attack in
Mombasa. 18 Previously, there were reports of “Al-Shabab brides” arrested in Northeast
Kenya on their way to join militants in Somalia.19
Many speculate that women are recruited because they are thought to be less likely to be
suspected of violent extremism, less likely to be seen as “posing an imminent threat,” and
“able to travel” without raising suspicion.20 While women in Kenya join violent extremist
efforts as “sympathizers, facilitators and perpetrators,”21 they tend to act as recruiting agents
rather than participating in combat roles.22
Various factors have been identified as encouraging women to join extremist causes. The
ostracization and marginalization of “women left behind” by male family members who have
gone to fight with ISIS or Al-Shabab, or have been killed or abducted by Kenyan security
forces, can serve as push factor for those women.23 Exploitation of women by security forces,
including sexual violence, can sometimes lead women towards violent extremist ideology.24
Some Kenyan women are pulled to join Al-Shabab and ISIS in hopes to achieve martyrdom
by fighting for a religious cause, while others have been deceived and coerced into joining the
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groups. 25 For instance, some women have gone to Somalia to find their “disappeared”
husbands only to be abducted or threatened with violence to participate in violent activities.26
Al-Shabab has forced some of these women into sexual slavery.27 Other women are trafficked
to Somalia, and still others are pulled by the promise of large dowries, only to be forced to
join Al-Shabab after marriage.28
DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Independent organizations and government actors, in collaboration with local and
international civil society organizations, are conducting research to understand the general
drivers of violent extremism and radicalization in Kenya—that is, the “push” and “pull”
factors for “at risk” individuals. One such study, Countering Violent Extremism and Risk
Reduction: A Guide to Programme Design and Evaluation, conducted by the Royal United
Services Institute (“RUSI”), explains the structural motivators, individual incentives, and
enabling factors for “at risk” individuals in Kenya.29 Individual incentives can include “a
sense of purpose (generated through acting in accordance with perceived ideological tenets),
adventure, belonging, acceptance, status, material enticements, fear of repercussions by
violent extremism groups, [and] expected rewards in the afterlife.” 30 This finding is
corroborated by another study, Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of AlShabaab and Somali Youth, drawn from interviews with former Al-Shabaab members.31 The
study reports that those who joined the group were seen by some as “heroes for defending the
country and religion.”32
Another study, Radicalization in Kenya, involving interviews of 95 Al-Shabab fighters, finds
that although ideology plays an important role in recruitment efforts, social, political, and
economic oppression are primary reasons motivating individuals to join the group.33 Other
structural issues acting as push factors include “repression, corruption, unemployment,
inequality, discrimination, a history of hostility between identity groups, [and] external state
interventions in the affairs of other nations.”34
Unemployment, inequality and marginalization were also common push factors mentioned
during IHRC in-country research. 35 Young disenfranchised Kenyan men, often from poor
neighborhoods, are lured into Somalia with the promise of good jobs and large salaries.36
Upon reaching the country, they are coerced under threat of violence to join Al-Shabab and
undergo military training.37 In contrast, some young men have described Al-Shabab as a
“business,” and have joined the group willingly to make money.38 International Crisis Group
supports this narrative, having found that Al-Shabab “pays its soldiers and operatives well
and regularly, as well as provides for its veterans and the families of the martyrs.”39 Another
report concludes that Al-Shabab “capitalizes on . . . unemployment and feelings of
marginalization to recruit.”40 The MRC similarly derives its support from local discontent
about “long-held grievances over land and frustration at the perceived economic
marginalization of the region by the central government.”41
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Counterterrorism measures resulting in human rights violations, including excessive use of
force, extra judicial killings, police raids and disappearances of suspects and their families,
also act as push factors in Kenya. 42 A lack of trust in ineffective and corrupt public
institutions is also a driver of violent extremism in the country.43 Researchers have identified
“the presence of radical mentors (including religious leaders and individuals from social
networks, among others), access to radical online communities, social networks with VE
associations, access to weaponry or other relevant items, a comparative lack of state presence,
[and] an absence of familial support” as enabling factors.44 ISIS and Al-Shabab both have
effective online recruitment techniques, often targeting both men and women at
universities.45
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN KENYA
Women’s struggle for empowerment and human rights in Kenya has been an uphill battle
against patriarchy, poverty, discrimination and exclusion from political decision-making.46
Although the 2010 Kenyan Constitution47 provides a legal framework to ensure basic human
rights for women and girls, women still face considerable challenges, including in obtaining
positions of political leadership. Women and girls are disadvantaged in the economic and
education spheres, in gaining employment and accessing financial assets. Eighty percent of
Kenyan women are engaged in small holder farming, but only 1 percent own land. Women
have access to less than 10 percent of available credit, and less than 1 percent of agricultural
credit. 48 High rates of poverty among women is exacerbated by gender-based violence,
including rape, sexual harassment and other sexual violence. According to the 2014 Kenya
Demographic and Health Survey, 4 out of every 10 women in Kenya have experienced some
form of violence, whether physical or sexual. 49 Rural women in Kenya are the most
marginalized as traditional gender roles that define divisions of labor make them politically,
economically, and socially dependent on men.
Kenya has introduced several policies and legislation promoting gender equality and
protection of women and girls. These include: a Presidential Decree that women constitute
30 percent of formal appointees to public posts; a ban on female genital mutilation;50 the
establishment of Family Courts and a Gender Commission; women-specific police stations
and gender desks in Government Ministries, police stations, and parastatals; the Gender
Policy Bill and the Sexual Offenses Act; and other legal instruments. 51 Kenya has also
launched a Joint Programme on Prevention and Response to Gender Based Violence 2017–
2020 to “accelerate efforts towards the elimination of [gender based violence] in Kenya.”52
Despite these and other advancements, female political candidates have faced hurdles, such
as verbal and physical abuse during campaigns53 and sexual violence during the post-election
violence of 2007–2008.54
Under the Constitution of Kenya, all international and regional treaties, conventions and
laws among other instruments ratified by Kenya form part of the country’s laws.55 Kenya has
committed to protecting and promoting women’s human rights and equality by ratifying
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several core international treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (“CEDAW”), the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (“ICESCR”). Kenya has not, however, ratified the Optional Protocol to CEDAW.56 At
the regional level, Kenya is party to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights
(“ACHPR”), and has ratified the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and
the Convention Governing Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Kenya has also
ratified the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and
Peoples’ Rights, but it does not accept the Court’s jurisdiction on individual complaints.57
Kenya has not ratified the Maputo Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa.58
In 2011, the CEDAW Committee provided recommendations to the Kenyan government to
improve women’s human rights in the country. The Committee expressed concern at the high
prevalence of sexual violence against women and girls and recommended that Kenya
“respond to the existing culture of underreporting and impunity by criminalizing marital
rape and investigating, prosecuting and punishing perpetrators of sexual violence.”59 The
Committee urged the government to adopt a “comprehensive strategy to modify or eliminate
harmful practices and stereotypes that discriminate against women, in conformity with . . .
[CEDAW].”60
In 2012, the Human Rights Committee expressed concern about “acts of physical and sexual
violence by the police towards refugees following bomb explosions that claimed the lives of
some police officers at Dadaab camp.”61 The Committee urged the Kenyan government to
“conduct thorough investigations into all incidents of violence including allegations of
violence by law enforcement personnel and bring those responsible to justice.” 62 The
Committee further highlighted concern over the “lack of a legal framework that clearly sets
out the human rights that must be respected in the fight against terrorism.”63
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Kenya has taken an aggressive approach to countering extremism at home and abroad.64 It
has passed several pieces of legislation, including its first Anti-Terrorism Law in 2012, the
Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (2011), the Prevention of Organized
Crime Act (2010), and the Security Laws (Amendment) Act (2014) (“SLAA”). These laws
establish a strong legal framework to prosecute acts of terrorism. 65 The SLAA contains
several measures that strengthen the mandate of Kenya’s National Counter-Terrorism
Centre to fight terrorism. These include “broadening evidentiary standards to allow greater
use of electronic evidence and recorded testimony in terrorism prosecutions” and
criminalization of participation in terrorist training.66 Civil society and political opposition
have objected to these and other provisions of the SLAA on grounds that they contravene
Kenya’s international obligations and violate constitutionally guaranteed civil liberties.67
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International and domestic civil society organizations have voiced serious concerns over the
government’s approach to counterterrorism. Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) Kenya has
investigated disappearances and renditions of individuals suspected or accused of terrorism
or extremist activities. It found that military and police excesses take place routinely in the
name of counterterrorism and efforts to counter violent extremism and that a variety of
activities are labeled “terrorism” without proper investigation.68 In response, the government
acts disproportionately against entire communities after incidents of violence, regardless of
whether the violence was ideologically motivated or more traditional criminal activity.
During these community raids, authorities have abducted and disappeared individuals
suspected of VE, according the HRW Kenya.69
Operation Usalma Watch, carried out in Nairobi in April 2014, is cited as a disturbing
example of the government’s flawed approach to PCVE.70 The operation was launched after
a series of grenade and gun attacks in Mombasa and Eastleigh, a predominantly Somali
neighborhood in Nairobi. During the weeks-long raids conducted by approximately 5,000
security forces, an estimated 4,000 individuals, including journalists, Kenyan citizens,
registered refugees and international aid workers, were harassed and detained.71 According
to Amnesty International’s Eastern Africa office, Operation Uslama Watch was “used as a
pretext for the blanket punishment of the Somali community in Kenya.”72 She argued that
Somalis were treated as “scapegoats with thousands arrested and ill-treated, forcibly
relocated and hundreds unlawfully expelled to a war-torn country.” 73 These claims are
supported by the fact that more than 1,000 Somalis, including breast-feeding women
separated from their infants, were forcibly relocated to Northern Kenya’s overcrowded,
insecure refugee camps.74
The lack of coordination between different arms of law enforcement and military in
conducting counterterrorism and PCVE measures is also an area of concern for stakeholders.
The 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garrisa School attack are key examples of this.75
In both cases, the lack of coordination between military and specialized tactical units has
been blamed for unnecessary deaths and the elongation of sieges.76
Corruption by Kenyan authorities in implementing counterterrorism and PCVE appear to be
a major concern. During Operation Uslama Watch, residents bribed law enforcement officials
to prevent them from raiding their homes. 77 Reports indicate that authorities unlawfully
detain Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees in order to receive bribes for their release.78 In
some cases, authorities refer to these groups as “cash-cows,” in reference to the system of
detention and bribery.79 Muslim women are especially targeted because Muslim families are
thought to pay higher bribes to prevent women from being detained in cells overnight.80
Still, it appears that Kenyan authorities are increasingly seeing the value of a softer approach
to counterterrorism. 81 The government has recently advanced several PCVE efforts to
prevent radicalization. These include redeployment of ethnic Somali police officers to their
home counties in Northeast Kenya to improve public confidence in the police with
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communities at risk of radicalization. The Ministry of the Interior has implemented a major
Community Policing Program called Nyumba Kumi, involving clustered households that are
encouraged to identify and report suspicious activities and “at-risk” individuals. 82 The
government is also focusing on counter messaging and reintegration of former foreign
terrorist fighters and Al-Shabab facilitators and sympathizers.
As part of these PCVE efforts, President Kenyatta launched the National Counter-Violent
Extremism (“NCVE”) Strategy in September 2016. The strategy was developed through a
consultative process involving government agencies, civil society, religious leaders, private
sector, researchers and other regional and international stakeholders.83 The strategy aims
“to give civil society and Faith Based Organizations an upper hand in fighting extremism and
terror,” in order to address recruitment and radicalization of vulnerable youth.84 A National
Counter Radicalization Strategy has also been launched which has seven pillars: “a media
strategy; psycho-social strategy; faith based strategy; capacity building strategy; political
strategy; education and security strategies.” 85 The National Counter-Terrorism Centre
(“NCTC”) is promoting localized implementation action plans for the strategy at the county
level,86 and has asked UN Women to provide gender training for NCTC officials and to aid in
establishing a gender desk at NCTC headquarters.87 However, stakeholders have expressed
concern that the NCVE strategy is gender-neutral and that it lacks a pillar to address the
unique challenges faced by women as victims, perpetrators and sympathizers of extremism.88
UN Women, Kenya and Humanity, Activism, Knowledge Integrity (“HAKI”) have made
efforts to introduce a gender pillar into the strategy.89
Notwithstanding these advancements, the Kenyan authorities have launched crackdowns in
recent years against civil society organizations in an effort to counter the financing of
terrorism. The country’s Non-Governmental Organization Coordination Board deregistered
sixteen NGOs in December 2014 for suspected, but unsubstantiated, links to terrorists and
funding of their activities.90 In 2015, a list of “entities suspected to be associated with AlShabaab” was published resulting in the freezing of the organizations’ accounts. 91 More
recently, the government is trying to establish an online portal for registration of all
individuals and organizations working on the NCVE strategy, which is being resisted by civil
society in light of these past abuses.92 This has created a difficult climate for civil society
organizations to operate in.
NON-GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Several non-governmental organizations (“NGOs”) are implementing PCVE programs with
funding from international donor agencies such as the United States Agency for International
Development (“USAID”), United States Institute of Peace (“USIP”), and International Civil
Society Action Network (“ICAN”), among others. Programs range from those that focus on
countering radicalization, rehabilitating “women left behind,” and protecting the populations
targeted by law enforcement counterterrorism measures.
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In Mombasa, African Women Advocating Peace and Security in Africa (“AWAPSA”) and the
Coastal Education Center (“COEC”) are implementing direct intervention programs funded
by USIP called Women Against Violence Extremism (“WAVE”).93 WAVE focuses on building
women’s resilience against violent extremism, supports women by providing psychosocial
support and economic opportunities, like microfinance, and also provides a forum for female
students to discuss challenges of combatting extremism in their communities. After Garissa
students were brought to Mombasa University following the attack, WAVE provided a
platform for female students to talk about their experiences. The Women’s Initiative for Their
Empowerment (“WIFE”) is another initiative that focuses on “women left behind.”94 WIFE
provides psychological support to women and attempts to reintegrate them in the society.
Other direct intervention programs attempt to bridge gaps between radical and moderate
youth.95 These programs engage individuals (14 to 30-years-old) who have dropped out of
school, or are unemployed for other reasons, through sport, debates, and exhibitions, among
other activities.96 These initiatives may also aid in detecting extremism.
AWAPSA and HAKI have also pursued media campaigns, via radio, social media, and
documentaries such as Raise Our Voices where “women left behind” share their experiences
and stories.97 Other media campaigns include documentaries such as Call Back Home, an
initiative of COEC, which focuses on youth involved in extremism. 98 Various direct
interventions programs targeting youth have also been launched in Kenya. These include
youth mentorship programs providing youth with an alternative forms of guidance. For
example, RUSI’s Peer Mentorship program pairs former criminals with youth mentees to
create a peer bond.99
AWAPSA and others have implemented community policing programs, such as the program
on women and law enforcement, to improve community relations and to encourage women to
share information with police, improving the state’s ability to detect extremism.
In addition, a number of community dialogue programs have been implemented. These
include programs by HAKI that employ theatre as a way to communicate PCVE messages
and hold community meetings where community leaders can speak directly with affected
women. 100 APWAPSA has also launched Friend without Borders, an inter-faith dialogue
between Christian and Muslim women.101 Another program titled Tuna Uwezo—“We Have
the Power”—aims to “reduce politically-motivated conflict, interethnic violence and sectarian
violence in the informal settlements in Nairobi” through community dialogue by “targeting
residents, especially young people, to engage in dialogue, air grievances and work toward
common resolutions.”102
Muslim groups in Kenya, such as the Supreme Council of Kenyan Muslims (“SUPKEM”), and
the Center for Ihsan and Educational Development (“CIED”) are also engaged in conducting
media campaigns among other initiatives to counter the use of Islam in legitimatizing violent
extremism activities. 103 As part of these efforts, people are working with the government to
allow “amnesty” for youth who joined Al-Shabab and now wish to return home. 104 They are
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also involved in capacity building of Muslim scholars and clerics to identify early warning
signs of radicalization.105
International organizations in collaboration with government and civil society organizations
are also implementing PCVE programs. For example, government and UNDP Kenya jointly
developed the UN Development Assistance Framework (“UNDAF”) 2014–2018. 106 United
Nations agencies in the country are also currently working to develop a unified PCVE
platform from which to engage government and civil society and launch PCVE programs,
with UNDP leading the effort.107
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UNITED STATES COUNTRY PROFILE
The United States has long been engaged in funding and implementing PCVE around the
world. However, the implementation of such programs within its own borders has been
more recent and subject to various concerns from a civil liberties and human rights
perspective. In 2011, for example, the White House introduced a PCVE program
exclusively focusing on Muslim communities in Los Angeles, Boston and Minneapolis.
The program was met with objections and resistance both from Muslim communities and
from civil society organizations who were concerned that programs targeting Muslims
would result in increased surveillance and harassment.
Despite these concerns, Muslim communities have not outright rejected PCVE programs.
In fact, communities have sometimes implemented their own versions of PCVE programs
without accessing government funds or resources, in an effort to maintain independence.
Engagement of women has not been prioritized in current PCVE initiatives, though
women have been participants and administrators in the programs. This may be because
women in the U.S. are seen as benefitting from greater levels of equality than in most
other countries, or because women continue to constitute a minority of recruits and
participants in violent extremism. Few federal programs contain an explicit focus on
women. Regardless, women’s roles in PCVE have not been significantly explored as a
consideration.
This profile discusses programs managed and funded by both the United States
government and by civil society to prevent and counter violent extremism. Because the
United States government has engaged in more expansive programming than Tunisia
and Kenya and because researchers have been able to access details on this programing,
this profile will spend more time on United States government-backed efforts than those
in Tunisia and Kenya.
RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
United States law generally differentiates between self-executing treaties (which
immediately upon ratification become a part of United States domestic law) and non-selfexecuting treaties (which require further Congressional action to be incorporated into
United States law). Some human rights treaties are self-executing while others are not.
The United States is a member of the Organization of the American States (“OAS”) and,
therefore, of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (“IACHR”). Human rights
obligations are generated by the OAS Charter, the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, and the American Convention on Human Rights.1 The United States
is both a party to the Charter and the Declaration but not the Convention. Thus, the
United States is subject to the American Declaration and the Commission but it does not
submit to the authority of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and has not ratified
any other OAS treaties.

106

In 1980, the United States signed the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), an international treaty adopted by the
United Nations General Assembly. 2 The treaty calls upon states to eliminate
discrimination of women in all areas of life, including political life, employment,
healthcare, and education. Despite signing the treaty, the United States is one of seven
nations that has not ratified the treaty, thereby not consenting to be bound by the treaty.3
Primary concerns over the United States’ adherence to CEDAW are around access to
reproductive and healthcare options, particularly abortion.4
The United States has signed and ratified the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (“ICERD”) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”). It has also signed the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”). The Committee on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination recommended that the definition of
racial discrimination used in state and federal contexts be reviewed.5 The Committee for
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination highlighted the incidence of rape and sexual
assault, particularly among Native women and migrant domestic workers, as well as
healthcare disparities between African American women and other demographic groups.6
The United States is a party to the Convention Against Torture.7 The Committee Against
Torture provided a number of recommendations in its 2010 report, including allowing
United Nations Rapporteur’s access to Guantanamo Bay to investigate allegations of
torture. The Human Rights Committee has also been concerned about the surveillance of
private communication of individuals by the United States government without proper
independent oversight. 8 The Human Rights Committee and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights expressed concerns over the loose definitions of
terrorism used by the United States, and the lack of constitutional courts adjudicating
crimes labeled terrorism. 9 Further, the Human Rights Committee recommended the
implementation of a National Human Rights Institution to coordinate adherence to
human rights treaties at the state, national, and local levels.10
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE U.S.
THE MUSLIM AMERICAN COMMUNITY
According to population estimates from 2015, Muslims make up 1 percent of the United
States population, and comprise 10 percent of the legal immigrants in the United States.11
According to a 2014 study by the Congressional Research Service, while 75 percent of
Americans in the United States express confidence in the Federal Bureau of
Investigations (“FBI”), only 60 percent of Muslim Americans have the same confidence in
the agency. 12 Muslims report being subject to invasive searches while driving and at
airport security checkpoints, which leads to a sense of alienation from law enforcement
agencies. 13 This unique and targeted focus on Muslim Americans in the context of PCVE
programs is thought to further lend to alienation.14
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This sense of mistrust has likely been worsened by undercover surveillance programs,
such as the FBI initiative that paid individuals to pose as new Muslim converts at
mosques to befriend Muslims, in order to provide intelligence on the community. The most
notorious of these cases, Operation Flex, in California, resulted in the Muslim community
reporting an FBI agent back to the FBI as a potential terrorist threat to America. 15
Similarly, the mass surveillance program implemented by the New York Police
Department in the tri-state area collected information about 26 ethnic groups that were
associated with Islam over several years, but yielded no information related to terrorism
or extremism.16
Similarly, the Counter Intelligence program (“COINTELPRO”) of the 1970’s monitored
many African American groups, including civil rights organizations like the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, and religious and political groups like
the Nation of Islam.17
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES AND COUNTERTERRORISM
For decades, United States intelligence agencies have monitored groups deemed potential
threats through the FBI, the Central Intelligence Agency (“CIA”), and the more recent
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). The DHS was formed in 2002 to unite 35
intelligence-gathering agencies in one federal department and collects information using
public-private partnerships and through the use of fusion centers.18 The Federal Bureau
of Investigation, which operates out of the Department of Justice, provides domestic
intelligence, and leads the Joint Terrorism Task Force.19 The Department of Justice also
manages United States Attorneys Offices.20
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (“FISA”) was passed in 1978 to regulate
incursions by intelligence gathering departments after the Church Committee identified
illegal practices that violated civil liberties like privacy and free speech.21 However, after
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI expanded its portfolio to include terrorism
prevention, in addition to its established law enforcement directive, and began to
contribute to “proactive domestic surveillance.”22
This agency shift was coupled with new legislation, including the USA Patriot Act
(“Patriot Act”), the Homeland Security Act and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act.23 Many of these acts were meant to bring together existing intelligence
organizations in order to share information and personnel, as well as to integrate
enforcement from the state to federal level.24 The sharing of information also reflected a
new approach to terrorism, in which intelligence organizations attempt to pinpoint and
prevent attacks before they occur.25 For instance, the Patriot Act expanded the definition
of terrorism to include domestic terrorism, and as a result, the government has more
power to investigate and gather intelligence in domestic contexts.26
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VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES
United States government programs use the FBI’s Countering Violent Extremism office’s
definition of violent extremists as “individuals who support or commit ideologically
motivated violence to further personal, political or social objectives, sometimes without
direction from or influence by a foreign actor.” 27 Government agencies recognize the
following factors for violent extremism: politics, religion and economics.28 Government
agencies have also identified conditions that may facilitate involvement in violent
extremism such as exposure to social media sites used for recruiting by extremist groups.29
The United States National Counter Terrorism Center has categorized the primary
ideologies responsible for attacks in the United States: anarchism, Islamic Extremism,
Eco terrorism and Right Wing Extremism. Eco terrorists and Right Wing Extremists
committed 8 percent of extremist attacks between 1995 and 2011.30 Twelve percent of
attacks during this time period were attributed to Islamic Extremists.31 According to the
FBI’s record of terrorist attacks, from 1980–2005, 6 percent of incidents were “attributable
to Muslims.”32
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism reports
that 80 percent of terrorist incidents in the United States from 1970–2013 were carried
out by “nonaffiliated individuals,” the Earth Liberation Front, and the Animal Liberation
Front. During the 2000’s, less than 2 percent of attacks were from groups that claimed to
be affiliated with fundamentalist Islam.33
As noted earlier in this report, one of the difficulties in recording data in terrorist attacks
is a lack of definitions; the FBI uses domestic terrorism and violent extremism
interchangeably, affecting the ways in which such cases are prosecuted.34 One particular
point of focus has been on Al Qaeda and Al Qaeda inspired militants, and more recently
in preventing individuals from traveling to or receiving instruction from the Islamic State
(also, “ISIS,” “ISIL” or “Daesh”), otherwise known by its Arabic acronym Dawla alIslamyia fil Iraq wa’al Sham.35
The United States’ intelligence and law enforcement agencies continue to be interested in
the Muslim community to prevent both domestic terrorism crimes, as well as recruitment
to foreign extremist organizations. The current emphasis is on preventing American
participation in ISIS.36 Worldwide an estimated 20,000 fighters have gone to Iraq and
Syria to fight. Approximately 150 Americans have attempted, some unsuccessfully, to
reach the region.37
In another estimate, of the 3.3 million Muslims in America, only 250 have gone overseas
to join foreign fighter groups. This represents only 0.0075 percent of the Muslim-American
population. 38 This is far less than France, where 0.036 percent of the Muslim-French
population has attempted to join foreign fighter groups, or Tunisia, where 0.054 percent
(or 6,000 Muslims out of 11 million) has done the same.39 American Muslims who have
traveled abroad to participate with extremist organizations have been found to not be
active participants in the Muslim American community, and do not frequent mosques or
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Muslim social centers.40 Moreover, there is no city or community in the United States with
a significant concentration of Muslims who have gone abroad to join fighter groups.41
While the number of American Muslims who joined foreign fighter groups dropped by 40
percent in 2016, the number of right wing and White Nationalist militia groups has
grown.42 The Southern Poverty Law Center, which tracks hate groups, has reported that
militia groups have grown over 600 percent between 2008 and 2012.43 The number of
followers on twitter that right wing groups have been able to accrue also grew by 600
percent between 2012 and 2016.44
HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS IN THE U.S.
HISTORY OF WOMEN’S RIGHTS
The equal rights of women are not provided for in the United States’ founding documents.
The Declaration of Independence states: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all
men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness” (emphasis
added). 45
The freedom of religion for all is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment state, “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a re-dress of grievances.” 46 The First
Amendment also provides a legal basis for challenging state regulation of expression,
including practice, association, and belief.47
Women’s basic rights have been advanced through various statutes, constitutional
amendments and court interpretations of women’s constitutional rights. Between 1777
and 1807, women’s right to vote, which had been practiced in some of the early American
colonies, was revoked by all states.48 Starting in 1839, states began passing the Married
Women’s Property Act, allowing women to own and control their own property, a change
from the inherited British common law of coverture where the husband upon marriage
subsumed a woman’s rights and property.49 Women were granted the right to vote by the
19th constitutional amendment in 1919, after decades of lobbying. 50 Women were
historically denied equal access to education and professions, such as medical school and
law school. 51 The first women admitted to medical school were not admitted until 1915.52
The first women governors were not elected until 1925, and the first woman federal judge
was not appointed until 1928.
The Equal Rights Amendment, a constitutional amendment that would prohibit
discrimination against women, was first proposed in 1923, and stated, “[m]en and women
shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its
jurisdiction.” In 1972, Congress approved of the Equal Rights Amendment that stated
“[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or
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by any State on account of sex.”53 To take hold, the amendment had to be ratified by 38
states, but by 1982 failed to pass by three states.54 The Equal Pay Act was passed in 1963,
the first federal law that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, followed by the
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 which protects women in employment, and Title IX in
1972 which guarantees equal access in education and athletic resources to both genders.55
In 2009 the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act was passed by President Obama, lifting time
restrictions on the period to file complaints of discrimination related to compensation.56
CURRENT STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES
Increasing participation of women in policymaking on national security issues has been
one strategy to developing responsive national security systems. Amy Pope, former
Deputy Homeland Security Advisor on the White House National Security Council, has
stated that the participation of women in leadership roles provides additional perspectives
to agency decisions, more details about experiences unique to women, and a higher level
of legitimacy for programs that target women.57
Though women now make up half of the workers in the United States, indicators of
women’s status in the United States are below men’s in many categories. The United
States ranks 65th in global wage equality according to the World Economic Forum, with
women paid 78 percent of what men are paid in similar job positions.58 This disparity
becomes greater for women of color; black women are paid 64 percent and Latina women
paid 56 percent compared to white men in similar positions.59 Fifty-six percent of women
born outside of the United States participate in the labor force.60 In 2016 women held
fewer than 20 percent of seats in the National House of Representatives and the Senate.61
The United States is still one of 32 countries that does not have an explicit gender equality
guarantee in its Constitution.62 Gender disparities in economic status and employment
vary by state, with lower income states reflecting the largest disparities.
GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO COUNTERING VIOLENT
EXTREMISM
The distinction drawn by the United States government between counterterrorism
programs and PCVE programs is that the latter lack “law enforcement suppression.”63
Counterterrorism programs target an individual once an individual has decided to engage
in violence, known as “mobilization.”64 An alternative definition is that counterterrorism
targets “violent or illegal action taken on the basis of radical or extremist beliefs,” whereas
PCVE focuses on “radicalization,” described as “the process of acquiring and holding
radical or extremist beliefs.”65
Despite having no process to define an individual’s path to violent extremism, the White
House Strategy includes identifying “warning signs” that someone is “recruited or
radicalized to violence” and disseminating those signs to family members and friends in
targeted communities. 66 A guide released by the National Counter Terrorism Center
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ranks communities and individuals on risk and protective factors such as neighborhood
safety, cohesiveness among community members, “experiences of loss,” and “general
health.”67 However, no studies are cited to back up the use of these factors within the
study or the level of correlation between the listed factors and violent extremism.
For this reason, and acknowledging the stigma PCVE programs may carry, government
agencies implement PCVE programs using existing social services, including public
health, mental health, and educational agencies.68 The federal government cites three
models for their approach to violent extremism: (1) the Comprehensive Gang model;
(2) the Safe Schools/Healthy Students Initiative; and (3) the Building Communities of
Trust Initiative.69
The government approach to PCVE posits that certain individuals are more susceptible
to violent extremism and acknowledges that they cannot currently predict which
individuals fall into this category. This is seen as an obstacle that can be overcome using
additional data and resources in a local context.70 The DHS stated in 2016 that it would
create a research agenda through a searchable library selectively available to domestic
and international partners by October 2017.71 The National Institute of Justice and the
Department of Homeland Security are providing funding grants for additional research
into the topic.72 Since 2012, $14 million has been provided in grant funding to universities,
research institutes, and hospitals for 28 projects related to domestic radicalization.73
PCVE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
In 2003, the Department of Homeland Security began to conduct public outreach through
its Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties. While the initial outreach was to
communicate avenues of redress for potential violations of civil liberties, recent PCVE
programs have been coordinated through The Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
(CRCL) and the DHS Community Engagement Section.74
Following media reports of bias in PCVE training, a Government Accountability Office
Report was created on Countering Violent Extremism related training, provided to 28,000
state and local entities between 2010 and 2011.75 These trainings focused primarily on
cultural competency or violent extremism, rather than community engagement.76 Many
of the programs use terms interchangeably when they refer to different concepts: “Islamic
culture” is often conflated with “Middle Eastern Culture,” “Arab-Americans” are
construed as “Muslims,” and “Arabic Culture” is conflated with “Islam.”77
Leadership in Counterterrorism aims to, among other things, familiarize officers with
various types of United States domestic terrorist groups and educate them on the
historical development of violent Islamic extremism. This course is taught in a symposium
format and includes sessions on Middle Eastern culture and basic Islamic beliefs.78
Several complaints have been filed alleging the trainings or trainers made statements
that were untrue or discriminatory. Some complaints were accepted as valid and
particular guest speakers were disinvited from the program.79 One of the complaints was
over material provided to all 4,400 members of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, which
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stated, “Sunni Muslims have been prolific in spawning numerous and varied
fundamentalist extremist terrorist organizations. Sunni core doctrine and end state have
remained the same and they continue to strive for Sunni Islamic domination of the
world.”80 The FBI reviewed the statement and determined, “the materials to, among other
things, conform to constitutional principles, adhere to the FBI’s core values, be tailored to
the intended audience, and focused to ensure message clarity.”81
2011 PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM STRATEGY
In 2011, the United States launched a formal PCVE strategy titled Empowering Local
Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States (the “White House plan”).82
The program focuses on the threats by “Al Qa’ida and affiliate networks” 83 through
interventions by local officials and communities using resources from the federal
government to create PCVE capacity. The program is led by Attorney Generals and
implemented through federal agencies, the DHS, FBI, the United States Agency for
International Development, the National Counterterrorism Center, and the Departments
of Defense, Justice, Education, Health and Human Services, and Labor.84
The 2017 fiscal year budget for the Department of Justice program is $4 million for
research, $6 million for local PCVE models, $2 million for technical assistance, and $3
million for demonstration models of these projects in which law enforcement partner with
local stakeholders.85 The Department of Homeland Security has $50 million to respond to
threats of violent extremism, which includes PCVE programming.86 The Department of
Homeland Security also appointed a full time PCVE coordinator. Grant programs that are
not specific to PCVE are provided through the DHS Urban Areas Security Initiative and
the DOJ Community Oriented Policing Services Program.87
The goals of the program have been listed as: “(1) enhancing engagement with and support
to local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government
and law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering
violent extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.”88
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The activities explicitly taken on by the federal government are research funding, best
practice development, issuing grants and building connections with stakeholders.90 Civil
liberties are cited as a priority.91
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CHALLENGES IN DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Without clear models for what constitutes violent extremism, it is difficult to implement
an assessment program to track the effectiveness of PCVE efforts.92 In his closing remarks
at the Summit on Countering Violent Extremism, former President Barack Obama stated,
“by ‘violent extremism,’ we don’t just mean the terrorists who are killing innocent people.
We also mean the ideologies, the infrastructure of extremists—the propagandists, the
recruiters, the funders who radicalize and recruit or incite people to violence.”93
Defining violent extremism has been an ongoing challenge for PCVE programs in other
countries, such as the United Kingdom, where the number of outreach efforts may be
tallied, but not the effect of the efforts. 94 Standardizing any metrics will also be a
challenge given the different programs implemented and approaches taken for each. The
DHS plans to review their 2016 strategy every three years, starting in 2019, to determine
what successful programs are and what improvements should be made and to develop
metrics to measure these factors in 2017.95 However, variance in approaches and a lack
of consistent definitions are likely to make this a challenge.
The goal of the DHS-lead program is to target religious leaders, civil society, and youth
using social media and community interventions to prevent “individuals who support or
commit ideologically-motivated violence to further political goals”. 96 The White House
provided no definitive model by which people become engaged in violent extremism,
noting “there is not [a] single pathway to violent extremism.”97 The White House stated
that to counter violent extremism is to “disrupt efforts to recruit, radicalize and mobilize
followers” by addressing conditions and reducing factors that contribute to violence.98 The
program calls for integration of PCVE into existing programs such as public safety and
violence prevention.99
PCVE AND INTELLIGENCE GATHERING
The White House plan explicitly states that PCVE efforts do not include intelligence
gathering or investigations for criminal prosecution. 100 However, as part of federal
research into PCVE, the federal government has indicated they will make open-source
datasets for government departments to broaden understanding of behaviors related to
violent extremism.101
An additional portion of this program is the utilization of “fusion centers,” which are two
or more government agencies that exchange resources and information to “detect, prevent,
investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity.”102 Owned and run by state and
local government entities, fusion centers receive and share classified and unclassified
information from federal partners.103 Among their capabilities are to “build grassroots
intelligence and analytic capabilities” and “providing threat analysis.”104 Fusion centers
have become “all hazard” centers, which also monitor organized crime, immigration and
natural disasters.105 The White House plan includes coordination between fusion centers,
local law enforcement and communities to help identify “suspicious activity” and for the
protection of civil rights and liberties in the process.106 There are no uniformly adopted
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standards for the operation of fusion centers, and currently only 16 of 58 have adopted
the voluntary Fusion Center Guidelines promulgated by the federal government. 107
Without these provisions, it is unknown if fusion centers are abiding by statutes like the
1974 Privacy Act, which protects against the collection of information for citizens who
have not committed a crime.108
BOSTON, LOS ANGELES AND MINNEAPOLIS PILOT PROGRAMS
In 2013, former Attorney General Eric Holder announced the PCVE grant targeting
Muslim communities and in March 2014 the selected cities of Boston, Los Angeles and
Minneapolis were announced as pilot programs.109 Each city was selected to test different
approaches: a social-level approach in Minneapolis aimed at the large Somali-American
population: community-engagement in Los Angeles; and individual interventions in
Boston. 110 The goal of the pilot program is to pilot a number of the DHS initiatives,
evaluate their effectiveness, and expand the program to other prioritized cities and
regions in the United States.111
Each of the initial cities was provided a framework by the United States Attorney’s office
that reflected input from community and government stakeholders. The framework is to
be used as a flexible set of guidelines, with goals and solutions, to assist in the
implementation of each city’s program. 112 One notable program recommendation is
delivery of social services to participating individuals. These include language and civics
classes, culturally sensitive education, mental health services, and youth programs.113 In
2017, the DHS will provide a self-assessment to communities to understand the threat of
violent extremism in their communities, with the results used by the community partners
and the DHS.114
These PCVE programs have been criticized for lack of funding, lack of coordination, and
lack of buy in by targeted communities.115 Some have noted that negative community
reactions have been caused by the government’s failure to solicit input from stakeholders
that reflect the Muslim community’s racial and economic diversity. 116 The community
outreach done was criticized for focusing on the most well-connected Muslims rather than
marginalized segments of the population, like those who would require government aid
for mental services.
Intelligence agencies involved in the program have both asked for additional resources,
and have not had formal mechanisms on how to coordinate with each other.117 The lack of
programming focusing on any other groups, particularly right wing nationalist groups,
further contributes to the perception of the program as biased and ineffective for the
overall goal of preventing violent extremism.
THE BOSTON FRAMEWORK
The framework for the Boston program emphasizes “prevention and intervention” and is
aimed at building the resilience and capacity of communities to discourage members to
become involved in violent extremism. 118 The framework identifies seven problems it
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seeks to address, such as alienation of youth, distrust between authorities and Muslim
communities, lack of knowledge about Islam in mainstream American culture, and the
use of social media in recruitment. 119 For each of the seven “problems” identified,
proposed solutions are listed. For example, problem 1 is the fact that alienated and
disaffected youth are particularly vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremist
organizations. Some potential solutions are offered include working with schools and faith
based organization to assist youth in developing critical and conflict resolution skills,
developing programs to promote civic engagement, and increasing mental health services
for youth. 120 Programs are meant to be integrated in environments apart from law
enforcement, such as academic and social work environments, and coordinated by the
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Massachusetts.121
Despite engagement of academia and other non-government sectors, the program was met
with some dissent. The Executive Director of the Islamic Society of Boston Cultural
Center (“ISBCC”)122 refused to sign on to the program because the PCVE programs singled
out the Muslim community and reinforced stereotypes about the American Muslim
community as inherently violent, rather than providing social services to all
demographics within the city who would benefit from them.123
THE LOS ANGELES FRAMEWORK
The Los Angeles framework begins by emphasizing civil rights and civil liberties, and
specifies the three pillars of the program as “prevention, intervention, and interdiction.”124
Prevention is oriented towards the community, intervention for the individual, and
interdiction for disrupting a “criminal threat.”125 Again the PCVE framework centers on
American Muslim populations.
The first Department of Homeland Security Office for Strategic Engagement was
established in Los Angeles in conjunction with the city’s Human Relations Commission in
2008.126 This later became the Interagency Coordination Group, consisting of the Sheriff’s
Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Human Relations Commission, the United
States Attorney’s Office, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, California Department
of Justice, United States Citizenship and Immigration Service, the Transportation
Security Administration, and the Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health.127
Working with non-governmental agencies, Los Angeles has also conducted town hall
meetings, community awareness briefings and training seminars for hate crimes and
domestic violence. Private sector partners have engaged social media to advocate against
violent extremism. The framework acknowledges that civic society-oriented programs do
not exclusively advance goals of PCVE programs, rather they strengthen communities
overall. The framework acknowledges the difficult dynamics between civil society and
Muslim American groups and law enforcement, due to the stigma attached to the
program, and the risk of surveillance. 128 However, the framework reiterates that the
program should be “community driven” in its implementation.
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THE MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL FRAMEWORK
The framework in the twin cities of Minneapolis-St. Paul notes that the large number of
Somali immigrants are peaceful but also sets forth the timeline of recruitment of young
Somali Minnesotans by Al-Shabaab, the Somali military group designated as a terrorist
organization. 129 The United States District Court of Minnesota has thus far convicted
twenty Somalis on terrorism charges. 130 The framework aims, like the Los Angeles
framework, to be community driven, relying on existing relationships like the Hennepin
County Sheriff Office’s relationship with the Somali Advisory Council, the St. Paul Police
Department’s community engagement team, and federal youth advisory boards with
Somali youth.131
After a period of community feedback, the root causes of “radicalization” (a term never
defined in the framework) were identified as: disaffected youth, identity crisis, community
isolation, lack of opportunity, and a disconnect between youth and religious leaders.132
The model adopted to address PCVE is “engagement, prevention and intervention,”
adopted from public safety models like the Gang Reduction Model.133 “Engagement” seeks
to increase relationships between law enforcement and youth, by increasing the number
of personnel oriented towards the community. “Prevention” aims to increase resources
provided to the Somali American population, and “intervention” targets schools and the
greater community with youth workers.
Below is the Minneapolis framework for building community resilience included in
proposal:
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PROGRAMMATIC CONCERNS OF PCVE PROGRAMS
Each of the above frameworks begins by summarizing anticipated critiques—the singling
out of Muslims, potential weakening of civil liberties for Muslims, and increase in
securitization of those communities. However, each framework has still been the subject
of criticism by civil society organizations on those very grounds. The primary challenge
appears to be the implementation of these programs by law enforcement, despite attempts
to create more community policing models within these authorities. The Congressional
Research Service evaluated the 2011 and 2014 White House PCVE Plans and identified
that the processes by which Muslim American groups were being selected were opaque,
with no comprehensive list of currently operating grant programs.135 This was seen as
contributing to the impression that PCVE programs were for intelligence gathering
purposes. Further, there were no guidelines on the intervention models provided in any
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of the programs for at-risk individuals, or definitions for violent extremist narratives,
making it difficult for coordinating agencies to implement proposed programs.136
Two of the frameworks above reference women specifically. The Los Angeles framework
states that the third challenge in implementation is “expanding and enhancing
engagement efforts with women and youth so that stronger partnerships and leadership
can be developed within those groups.”137 The Minneapolis-St. Paul framework suggests
utilizing “mothers” to be an intervention individual in the program.138 These are the only
mentions of women specifically as program leaders, participants or targets.
MUSLIM-COMMUNITY DESIGNED PCVE PROGRAMS
As mentioned above, apart from United States government lead programs, Muslim civil
society groups have developed their own models with varying levels of collaboration with
the federal and local government.
WORDE MONTGOMERY COUNTY
World Organization for Resource Development and Education (“WORDE”) is a community
led private-public PCVE program in Montgomery County, Maryland. Montgomery County
Executive Office of Community Partnerships executed the program through its Faith
Community Working Group. At its start, the program was funded by the county and
received additional funding from the Department of Justice through the Community
Oriented Policing Services grant program. The program focused on an “early-warning
system” which trains community members and law enforcement to “identify” individuals
at-risk for violent extremism and facilitates interventions through faith centers and social
service organizations.139
WORDE focused on a gang prevention model, utilizing five risk factors: economic
deprivation, political grievances, psychological factors, social factors, and lack of
education. Taking a more nuanced approach than many government models, the
organization does not present “a single profile of what makes someone a terrorist,” in
particular referencing the lack of empirical studies that conclusively demonstrate a
“radicalization” path.140
Another program associated with the WORDE model is the Crossroads Program, which
explicitly targets residents “from the Middle East, South Asia and North/East/West
Africa.” Offering culturally sensitive counseling, the program gives a “treatment plan” for
ideological, psychological, economic and sociological risk factors. The Crossroads Program
utilizes pre and post quantitative and qualitative assessments in conjunction with the
University of Maryland.
MPAC SAFE SPACES
The Muslim Public Affairs Council (“MPAC”) has provided its own PCVE framework in
its toolkit titled “Safe Spaces.” The toolkit seeks to offer a community alternative to the
“heavy handed law enforcement counterterrorism tactics”. 141 As MPAC represents
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members of the Muslim American community, it believes it is best situated to address the
concerns of the American Muslim community.142
The toolkit itself provides a two-step intervention model, prevention and intervention.
The Prevention prong emphasizes the development of “safe spaces” within Muslim
American communities, in particular for Muslim youth, where any topic, including those
that may be considered taboo, can be discussed openly. This safe space should also provide
opportunities for political participation, adult mentorship, interfaith partnerships and
digital literacy. The steps detailed for the intervention portion of the toolkit include
securing legal counsel, developing an evaluation team, conducting an assessment of
potential situations, and finally calling law enforcement if necessary. The toolkit includes
limited guidelines on state duty to protect laws, other organizations to contact, and
religious sources for countering violence.143
The program is adopted voluntarily by community groups and Islamic Centers, and
facilitates programs deemed necessary to the community. The program focuses on psychosocial needs of individuals within the Muslim community, often younger individuals, but
not exclusively so. 144
EDVENTURES NEXT GEN
Gen Next Foundation, based in Newport Beach, California, was founded by a group to
fight terrorism online. Gen Next works with online programs like Google for the “redirect
method.” The redirect method redirects searchers on websites like YouTube to anti-ISIS
messages when the service detects someone is seeking out information related to the
group.145 For example, if an individual searches for an ISIS-related video, a suggested
video will appear in which young people discuss the brutal conditions under a Daesh
controlled territory.146
OPPOSITION TO PCVE PROGRAMS
SECURITIZATION OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY
In some European countries, government officials have begun to reassess and dismantle
community targeting PCVE programs that have been implemented for a decade. The high
costs associated with prevention programs and the difficulty in assessing their
effectiveness have made them less appealing to law enforcement authorities. As an
alternative, an individual-focused intervention model has become more popular, since it
is far easier and cheaper to target an individual than entire communities.147 The language
of “safeguarding” has been adopted rather than “prevention” or “countering.”148 Similarly,
the term “countering violent extremism” itself has been questioned. Some, like Duke
University Professor Jayne Huckerby, find that the term is associated with a policy of
securitization, rather than community resiliency or peace-building initiatives. 149
Huckerby argues that building community is the true goal of PCVE programs, a goal
which current PCVE indicators and markers do not appropriately measure.150
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Despite the commitments made by the PCVE designers to “a commitment to work through
an inclusive process that will not polarize communities,” the White House’s Countering
Violent Extremism program was not well received by Muslim Americans or civil society
groups. 151 The Brennan Center for Justice, a well-respected public policy and law
institute, stated that such programs are based on insufficient evidence that markers used
to identify radicalization are empirically justified.152 Furthermore, it is not guaranteed
that those who harbor “radical” thoughts will follow through with them or that those who
commit terrorism do so for ideological reasons.153 Since there is no linear pathway to
extremism, it is difficult to identify when behavior is indicative of risk factors, or normal,
particularly in adolescents.154 Further, there is no data to suggest that Muslim-American
violent extremists have a distinct demographic profile.155
In contrast, the targeting of Muslim populations has been noted to overlap with and
undermine community cohesion work by stigmatizing this particular community. 156
Increasing hate crimes against Muslims has heightened concern of stigmatization and
marginalization for Muslim communities.157 That current PCVE government programs
target Muslim groups exclusively is arguably discriminatory, since right wing militia
groups are actually responsible for the majority of violent extremism. 158 The existing
community outreach elements of the programs appear token to some, rather than
substantive program components.159 Further, according to nationwide surveys, 55 percent
of Muslim men and 42 percent of Muslim women find that no Muslim-American
organization “represents their interests.” 160 Finding local organizations with which to
effectively partner is difficult where such organizations have not made sufficient inroads
into the larger Muslim community in America.
Farah Pandith, former Special Representative to Muslim Communities the United States
Department of State, described the dilemma as, “[d]ay in and day out we're trying to build
a community, saying you're part and parcel of the American fabric. You are an American
citizen. I raise my girls and say they have the same rights as others. The fact is, when
you're going to come present a program and say it's specially geared to prevent growing
extremism in the Muslim community, you're by default saying my community is more
predisposed to extremism. It sets people off.”161
As one government accountability report suggests, outreach appears to be more effective
when the Muslim community initiates it and when local government authorities, like a
Mayor’s office, collaborate instead of the federal government.162 However, the success of
the collaboration is also dependent on the history and relationship between the
implementing agency and the community. Programs like the New York Police
Department’s surveillance of Muslim communities, which were defended by Michael
Bloomberg, were seen as damaging to outreach efforts conducted by the FBI.163
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CIVIL LIBERTIES OBJECTIONS TO PCVE PROGRAMS
As noted in a Congressional Research Service Report on Countering Violent Extremism,
the White House’s Strategy to bolster counter-narratives to violent extremism inevitably
means PCVE will be sifting through acceptable and unacceptable narratives and
ideologies.164 It is unclear whether the PCVE strategy will require a creation of a counternarrative by federal authorities rather than selecting among current strategies.165 A DHS
objective for the end of 2017 was to work with community partners to distribute
“community generated content that counters violent extremism narratives.”166 Further, it
is difficult to understand how the program will be implemented with no clear definition
of an extremist “narrative.”167
Moreover, these programs do not create boundaries between intelligence gathering and
community support, allowing for intelligence collected from PCVE programs to be later
used in criminal prosecution.168 The use of government informants in previous programs
has created an impression that PCVE programs are part of a broader entrapment effort.169
Informants within the Muslim community are often active in community dynamics,
offering hypothetical violent schemes that would not otherwise be in circulation within a
community.170
Civil liberties advocates have pointed out the tension in PCVE programs. Maher Hathout
of the Muslim Public Affairs council, for example, noted, [p]eople cannot be suspects and
partners at the same time.” 171 Similarly, the 2011 Government Accountability Office
report describes the tension when U.S. Attorneys both act as community liaisons while
maintaining their roles as chief prosecutors in terrorism cases.172 In a survey of United
States Attorneys taken in 2016, 44 percent of offices received training on community
outreach and engagement for PCVE and one third of United States Attorney’s offices
provided local authorities training on outreach to communities for PCVE efforts.173 This
is contrasted with 71 percent of United States attorney’s offices that have conducted
outreach and engagement against extremism related to ISIS and Al Qaeda for local
communities.174 Ninety-six percent of United States Attorney’s Offices collaborated with
the FBI for outreach efforts, but 94 percent of offices received no additional funding to
implement outreach and engagement programs.175
Quintan Wiktorowicz, the White House advisor who formerly oversaw government PCVE
policy, told Politico, “[i]f you think about the roles and responsibilities of United States
Attorneys, they can’t possibly take on that function in a really robust way.” 176 Todd
Gallinger of the Council of American Islamic Relations stated, "[p]rosecutors: They get
gold stars for not being amazing community liaisons; they get gold stars for putting people
in jail.”
Evidence indicates that the FBI has already used “mosque outreach” sessions for
intelligence gathering. Files on mosque outreach documents have been heavily redacted,
but still indicate that the meetings document the identities of congregants, their religious
views and affiliations, travel histories and the physical locations and layouts for the
mosques visited.177
122

Civil liberty groups argue that similar programs could be utilized to stymy other
unpopular groups, including activists and protestors. PCVE programs could be employed
to gather intelligence on their activities, restricting first amendment practices of free
speech and gatherings. 178 Even the identified first step of radicalization in the PCVE
program, adoption of beliefs and association with like-minded people, is a protected first
amendment activity.179 Consistent with this concern, the American Civil Liberties Union
filed a Freedom of Information Access injunction in February 2016 for more information
about civil liberties and equal protection safeguards in PCVE programs.180
As a result of these objections, some Muslim community groups have been resistant to
participating in PCVE programs. University chapters of the Muslim Students
Associations have hired “anti PCVE Campaign Managers” and the Council of American
Islamic Relations has directed mosques to not participate with the implementation.181
The California chapter of the Council for American Islamic Relations cited concerns with
the lack of transparency for the White House PCVE program. The five questions
surrounding the program include why the three cities were selected as targets and how
much money will be allocated to these programs besides the explicit grant programs.182
Since the Trump administration, four community groups that had previously applied for
federal funding under PCVE programming have subsequently refused the grants. Much
of the new opposition is in response to the Trump administration rhetoric focusing on
Muslims as a unique extremist threat.183 If the strategic implementation plan requires
that groups are receptive and cooperative with law enforcement, the level of opposition,
lack of transparency and unanswered critiques means the current program is likely
unsustainable and unlikely to proceed successfully utilizing the necessary range of
community partnerships.
PROGRAMS PROMOTING GENDER EQUALITY AND INVOLVING WOMEN
AS STAKEHOLDERS
Within this problematic context, women have not been a focus of government run
programming or civil society managed responses. As noted by WORDE, this may be
reflective of the integrated presence of women within United States programming.184 The
integration of women in the Department of Homeland Security, as Attorney Generals, and
as community liaisons exists without explicit policies promoting their participation.
Though programs funded by the United States government have a focus on Muslim
communities, no program focuses on gender as a factor in their implementation. It is
arguable that the focus of such programming has been on disaffected male youth directly
rather than familial and community relationships involving women or the increasing
recruitment of women in violent extremist organizations. Regardless, United States
programs make little effort to explore the role of women in PCVE and so have missed an
important opportunity to promote women’s equality and more effectively advance PCVE
goals.
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